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[1297] 
The Law of Gender Stereotyping and the 
Work-Family Conflicts of Men 
Stephanie Bornstein 
This Article looks back to the early equal protection jurisprudence of the 1970s and 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s litigation strategy of using men as plaintiffs in sex 
discrimination cases to cast a renewed focus on antidiscrimination law as a means to 
redress the work-family conflicts of men. From the beginning of her litigation strategy as 
the head of the ACLU Women’s Rights Project, Ginsburg defined sex discrimination as 
the detrimental effects of gender stereotypes that constrained both men and women 
from living their lives as they wished—not solely the minority status of women. The 
same sex-based stereotypes that kept women out of the market sphere kept men out of 
the domestic sphere, and both were unlawful. Through a handful of key cases, 
Ginsburg challenged sex-based stereotypes that cast men as breadwinner and women as 
caregiver, succeeding in convincing the Supreme Court to establish a standard of 
heightened scrutiny for sex-based classifications. 
 
In the four decades since, women have made great strides in entering and advancing in 
the market sphere. Meanwhile, men’s advancement in the domestic sphere, while 
initially on the rise after the mid-1960s, has stalled since the late 1980s. Today, men 
have begun to prevail in lawsuits against their employers when they are penalized at 
work for participating in caregiving responsibilities at home. For the most part, 
however, their legal claims are not sex discrimination, but claims that courts can more 
easily recognize as actionable for men—such as violations of family and medical leave 
or benefits laws. Despite their lack of sex discrimination claims, however, such cases 
reveal the persistence of entrenched gender stereotypes about men’s and women’s 
proper roles when it comes to family caregiving. At the same time, Title VII case law 
now recognizes that penalties for gender nonconformity and stereotyping of mothers 
may be actionable sex discrimination. By combining these areas of jurisprudence, this 
Article argues that courts are failing to recognize actionable sex discrimination against 
men in the work-family context: Even without being covered by family and medical 
leave or benefits laws, men may prevail in lawsuits to redress penalties at work based 
on caregiving at home by alleging sex discrimination under a gender stereotyping 
theory. Following the reasoning first adopted by the Supreme Court in the equal 
protection cases litigated by Ginsburg in the 1970s, penalizing men at work for acting 
as caregivers instead of unencumbered breadwinners is sex discrimination under Title 
VII. 
 
  Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. I 
wish to thank Allison Tait (Yale Law School Class of 2011) and Jennie Stephens-Romero (Hastings 
Class of 2012) for their invaluable research assistance; Cynthia Thomas Calvert for her expertise in 
developing the Center for WorkLife Law’s database of caregiver discrimination cases, which provided 
a key research foundation; and Joan C. Williams for her essential feedback and support. 
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Introduction 
Forty years ago, shortly after Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 made discrimination on the basis of sex illegal in the workplace, 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg created a legal strategy to root out the same type 
of discrimination in other areas of life using the constitutional doctrine of 
equal protection.1 As the architect of the ACLU Women’s Rights Project 
litigation strategy, Ginsburg framed the problem the law needed to 
resolve not as the minority status of women, but as the unlawful sex-
based stereotyping of both men and women under traditional notions of 
“separate spheres” that constrained individuals from living their lives as 
they wished.2 Through a series of cases in the 1970s, Ginsburg succeeded 
in establishing a heightened level of scrutiny for sex-based classifications 
in state and federal laws.3 As she conceptualized it, writing sex-based 
stereotypes into the laws of the land was sex discrimination in violation 
of equal protection4—and the Supreme Court agreed. 
In the decades since, explicit sex-based distinctions in the law and 
the workplace have all but vanished, yet the stereotypes at their root 
remain, particularly at the intersection of work and family.5 As 
discrimination has become increasingly more subtle and our 
understanding of bias and stereotyping has evolved, the law has 
developed continually to redress modern-day discrimination. Consistent 
with Ginsburg’s early construction of sex discrimination as based on 
stereotypes, jurisprudence under Title VII now recognizes a gender 
stereotyping theory, under which workplace penalties and harassment of 
individuals for failing to conform to gender stereotypes may be 
actionable sex discrimination.6 A parallel line of case law under the 
 
 1. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1, 8–9, 37–38 
(1975) (discussing Title VII and constitutional law together); David Von Drehle, Redefining Fair with 
a Simple Careful Assault, Wash. Post, July 19, 1993, at A1 (discussing strategy); Tribute: The Legacy 
of Ruth Bader Ginsburg and WRP Staff, ACLU (Mar. 7, 2006), http://www.aclu.org/womens- 
rights/tribute-legacy-ruth-bader-ginsburg-and-wrp-staff (discussing strategy). See generally Amy Leigh 
Campbell, Raising the Bar: Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the ACLU Women’s Rights Project, 11 Tex. J. 
Women & L. 157 (2002). 
 2. See Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 28–29, 34–42 (“[I]ndeed above all else, the home-work gap 
must be confronted . . . . The breadwinning male/homemaking female division of functions deserves 
neither special favor nor condemnation by the law. It is a pattern individuals should be free to adopt 
or reject, without government coercion.”); Michael J. Klarman, Social Reform Litigation and Its 
Challenges: An Essay in Honor of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 32 Harv. J.L. & Gender 251, 271–75 
(2009) (“The most insidious of . . . [gender] stereotypes, Ginsburg believed, was that of male 
breadwinner and female homemaker.”). 
 3. See Von Drehle, supra note 1; ACLU, supra note 1. 
 4. See Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 
85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 83, 87–88, 91–92, 104–06, 120–25 (2010); Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 28–29, 34–42; 
Klarman, supra note 2, at 271–75. 
 5. See infra Part III. 
 6. See infra Part II. 
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Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (“FMLA”) has also recognized 
that the FMLA was intended to further redress sex discrimination and 
has identified that the intersection of work and family is where gender 
stereotyping remains the most entrenched.7 Most recently, developing 
law in the area of caregiver discrimination, along with the 2007 
enforcement guidance issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”), has applied Title VII gender stereotyping 
theory directly to the work-family context.8 
While most courts now follow these lines of jurisprudence and 
recognize detrimental stereotyping of working mothers as sex 
discrimination, courts fail to recognize the same theory when it penalizes 
men. The vast majority of cases brought by male plaintiffs in the work-
family context are brought under family and medical leave laws—
protections that fail to cover a significant portion of the workforce.9 In 
failing to recognize that the same gender stereotypes that police women 
out of breadwinning roles also police men out of caregiving roles, courts 
are missing a wide swath of impermissible sex discrimination. This 
Article argues that, as the law now stands, men may prevail in Title VII 
sex discrimination lawsuits when penalized for caregiving at work, even 
in the absence of leave or benefits laws. Connecting these related 
jurisprudential dots completes the vision for redressing the problem of 
sex discrimination that Ginsburg first articulated forty years ago: rooting 
out the detrimental gender stereotypes of separate spheres that constrain 
both women and men at work and at home.10 
 
 7. See infra Part III. 
 8. See infra Part IV. 
 9. For example, because of its length of service and size of employer requirements, the FMLA 
fails to cover a full 40% of the U.S. workforce (two in every five American workers), and lower-
income workers are more likely to lack coverage. Katherin Ross Phillips, The Urban Inst., Getting 
Time Off: Access to Leave Among Working Parents 1–2 (2004). As of the most recent U.S. 
Department of Labor survey data available, only 58.3% of all employees worked in FMLA-covered 
establishments, and only 46.9% of employees in the private sector were both covered by the FMLA 
and eligible to take FMLA leave. Jane Waldfogel, Family and Medical Leave: Evidence from the 2000 
Surveys, Monthly Lab. Rev., Sept. 2001, at 17, 19–20. 
 10. A great deal of scholarship has been written about Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s equal protection 
jurisprudence in the area of sex discrimination. For examples of this scholarship, see Julie A. 
Greenberg, The Gender Nonconformity Theory: A Comprehensive Approach to Break Down the 
Maternal Wall and End Discrimination Against Gender Benders, 26 T. Jefferson L. Rev. 37 (2003); 
Rebecca L. Barnhart & Deborah Zalesne, Twin Pillars of Judicial Philosophy: The Impact of the 
Ginsburg Collegiality and Gender Discrimination Principles on Her Separate Opinions Involving 
Gender Discrimination, 7 N.Y. City L. Rev. 275 (2004); Courtney Megan Cahill, Celebrating the 
Differences That Could Make a Difference: United States v. Virginia and a New Vision of Sexual 
Equality, 70 Ohio St. L.J. 943 (2009); Martha Chamallas, Ledbetter, Gender Equity and Institutional 
Context, 70 Ohio St. L.J. 1037 (2009); Jennifer Yatskis Dukart, Geduldig Reborn: Hibbs as a 
Success (?) of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Sex-Discrimination Strategy, 93 Calif. L. Rev. 541 (2005); 
Toni J. Ellington et al., Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Gender Discrimination, 20 Hawaii L. Rev. 
699 (1998); Kenneth L. Karst, “The Way Women Are”: Some Notes in the Margin for Ruth Bader 
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I.  Ginsburg’s Vision: Separate Spheres Violates the Equal 
Protection of BOTH Women AND Men 
From the beginning of her tenure as the founding director of the 
ACLU Women’s Rights Project, Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s goal was to 
“open all doors for men and for women” and to “get rid of all overt 
gender-based classifications” for men and women alike.11 Ginsburg 
understood that the same stereotypes that limited women’s advancement 
at work also limited men’s ability to participate actively in family life 
(which cyclically reinforced limitations on women’s advancement by 
perpetuating women’s near-total responsibility for home life).12 The 
central goal of the cases Ginsburg pursued on behalf of the ACLU in the 
1970s was to deconstruct the gender system, which led her to an unlikely 
strategy for a women’s rights organization: representing male plaintiffs.13 
Yet given her vision of sex discrimination as a two-sided coin of 
constraints imposed by sex-based stereotypes, she realized she could 
achieve her goal just as well by using either male or female plaintiffs.14 
Personal accounts of Ginsburg’s own experiences underscore her 
approach to sex discrimination as the unlawful operation of sex 
stereotypes. As a full-time working mother with young children, 
whenever the school her son attended needed to speak to a parent, they 
would call her.15 After a series of such interruptions while working as a 
Columbia law professor, Ginsburg decided to raise the school’s awareness: 
“This child has two parents,” she told the school administrator the next 
time she received such a call. “[P]lease alternate your calls; it’s his father’s 
turn.”16 After that, she found that the calls tapered off dramatically.17 
 
Ginsburg, 20 Hawaii L. Rev. 619 (1998); Deborah Jones Merritt, Hearing the Voices of Individual 
Women and Men: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 20 Hawaii L. Rev. 635 (1998); Carey Olney, Better 
Bitch than Mouse: Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Feminism, and VMI, 9 Buff. Women’s L.J. 97 (2000–2001); 
Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Pregnancy and Sex Role Stereotyping: From Struck to Carhart, 
70 Ohio St. L.J. 1095 (2009); Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Struck by Stereotype: Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg on Pregnancy Discrimination as Sex Discrimination, 59 Duke L.J. 771 (2010). In addition, 
many have written about the concept of gender stereotypes in the law. For recent examples, see 
Franklin, supra note 4; Monica Diggs Mange, The Formal Equality Theory in Practice: The Inability of 
Current Antidiscrimination Law to Protect Conventional and Unconventional Persons, 16 Columb. J. 
Gender & L. 1 (2007); Meredith M. Render, Gender Rules, 22 Yale J.L. & Feminism 133 (2010); Kerri 
Lynn Stone, Clarifying Stereotyping, 59 Kan. L. Rev. 591 (2011). 
 11. Interview by Joan C. Williams with Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Legally Speaking Series, Univ. of 
Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law, in S.F., Cal. (Sept. 15, 2011). 
 12. See Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 28–29, 34–42 (“Solutions to the home-work problem are as 
easily stated as they are hard to realize: man must join woman at the center of family life, and 
government must step in to assist both of them during the years when they have small children.”); 
Klarman, supra note 2, at 271–75. 
 13. See Interview by Williams, supra note 11; see also ACLU, supra note 1. 
 14. Interview by Williams, supra note 11. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
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Another account, from many years later, tells of a photograph on 
“prominent display” in Ginsburg’s judicial chambers, of “her son-in-law 
gazing adoringly at his newborn child.”18 Of the picture she explained, 
“This is my dream for society . . . . Fathers loving and caring for and 
helping to raise their kids.”19 
As she conceived of and litigated it in the 1970s—and as the 
Supreme Court agreed based on the outcome of the litigation—reliance 
on stereotypical notions of separate spheres, that men should be 
breadwinners and women caregivers, was sex discrimination against both 
women and men.20 “If I were to invent an affirmative action plan [for 
gender],” she recently explained, “it would be to give men every 
incentive to be close to children.”21 
A. Men and Women as Caregivers: REED V. REED and MORITZ V. C.I.R. 
In her first two briefs with the ACLU22—Reed v. Reed23 and Moritz 
v. C.I.R.24—Ginsburg challenged laws related to the proper roles of men 
and women as caregivers. With these two cases, Ginsburg established the 
litigation strategy she would pursue on behalf of the ACLU Women’s 
Rights Project throughout the next decade: to challenge state and federal 
statutes that wrote gender stereotypes into the law and to establish a 
heightened level of constitutional scrutiny for sex-based classifications.25 
Ginsburg viewed Reed and Moritz as companion cases, referring to them 
as the “mother” and “grandmother” cases.26 Her goal was to get both 
cases before the Supreme Court at the same time,27 to have the high court 
rule on laws that relied on the stereotype that women, and not men, 
should be caregivers, from the perspective of both male and female 
plaintiffs.28 When the Moritz plaintiff prevailed in the Tenth Circuit, 
however, the Supreme Court denied certiorari, leaving its ruling in Reed 
to set the path for cases that followed.29 
 
 17. Id. 
 18. Von Drehle, supra note 1. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See Franklin, supra note 4, at 87–88, 91–92, 104–06, 120–25; Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 28–29, 
34–42; Klarman, supra note 2, at 271–75; see also Dukart, supra note 10, at 558–61. 
 21. Interview by Williams, supra note 11. 
 22. See Franklin, supra note 4, at 125; Deborah Jones Merritt & Wendy Webster Williams, 
Transcript of Interview of U.S. Supreme Court Associate Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, April 10, 2009, 
70 Ohio St. L.J. 805, 809, 810 (2009). 
 23. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
 24. 469 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 906 (1973). 
 25. See Von Drehle, supra note 1; ACLU, supra note 1. 
 26. Interview by Williams, supra note 11; see Merritt & Williams, supra note 22, at 810–11. 
 27. Interview by Williams, supra note 11. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Moritz v. C.I.R., 412 U.S. 906 (1973) (denying petition for certiorari from 469 F.2d 466 (10th 
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In Reed, representing a woman, Ginsburg challenged an Idaho state 
probate law that distinguished between men and women in recognizing 
who was a preferable estate administrator after a family member’s 
death.30 Sally Reed and her husband Cecil separated, and later divorced, 
when their son Richard was a young child.31 When Richard committed 
suicide as a teenager, both parents sought to be the administrator of his 
estate.32 Under a state law requiring that where the parties petitioning to 
be estate administrators were equally entitled, males were preferred to 
females, the Idaho probate court appointed Cecil Reed as the 
administrator.33 
In her brief to the U.S. Supreme Court on behalf of Sally Reed, 
Ginsburg first articulated her argument that sex-based classifications in 
the law often rely on stereotypes and should be subjected to a higher 
level of constitutional scrutiny than a mere rational basis test.34 Here, the 
stereotype was that women, while suited to provide care as mothers, 
could not be involved in the financial matters of those children for whom 
they cared.35 Sally Reed had primary custody and raised Richard until he 
was a teenager, when Cecil sought and was awarded partial custody.36 
Sally opposed this because she thought Cecil was a bad influence; indeed, 
Richard committed suicide with a rifle owned by Cecil.37 Yet Sally’s 
contribution as primary caregiver was limited to just that by state law, so 
long as an equally suited man applied to be the estate administrator. 
Ginsburg’s brief highlighted the role that sex-based stereotypes and 
assumptions, particularly those about work and family, played in the 
Idaho state law. “Whatever differences may exist between the sexes,” she 
argued, “legislative judgments have frequently been based on inaccurate 
stereotypes of the capacities and sensibilities of women.”38 Arguing for a 
higher standard of scrutiny than rational basis when state laws relied on 
sex-based classifications, she honed in on the separate spheres ideology, 
arguing that “[t]he traditional division within the home—father decides, 
mother nurtures—is reinforced by diverse provisions of state law.”39 Yet 
“however much some men may wish to preserve Victorian notions about 
 
Cir. 1972)). 
 30. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 72 (1971). 
 31. Id. at 71; Merritt & Williams, supra note 22, at 811. 
 32. Reed, 404 U.S. at 71–72; Merritt & Williams, supra note 22, at 811. 
 33. Reed, 404 U.S. at 72–73. 
 34. Brief for Appellant at 5–7, Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (No. 70-4); see Merritt & Williams, supra note 
22, at 811–12. 
 35. Brief for Appellant, supra note 34, at 5–7. 
 36. Merritt & Williams, supra note 22, at 811. 
 37. Id.  
 38. Brief for Appellant, supra note 34, at 17. 
 39. Id. at 34. 
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woman’s relation to man, and the ‘proper’ role of women in society,” she 
reasoned, “the law cannot provide support for obsolete male prejudices 
or translate them into statutes that enforce sex-based discrimination.”40 
Turning the separate spheres ideology on its head, Ginsburg 
concluded her brief with an argument about the economic value of 
caregiving: Because she ran the household, Sally Reed was likely better 
suited than her ex-husband to manage the estate of her deceased child: 
[I]t is not unlikely that more women than men have the kind of 
“business experience” most relevant to the duties of an administrator. 
Women who do not work outside the home often handle most if not all 
the financial affairs of their family unit. Managerial responsibility, 
including the settlement of accounts and the preservation of property, 
is a central part of their daily occupation. As preparation for the duties 
of an administrator, experience in household management surely is not 
inferior to experience in such typically male occupations as truck 
driver, construction worker, factory worker, or farm laborer.41 
As Ginsburg reasoned, stereotypes that limited women’s roles to 
providing family care but not managing family affairs were not only 
unfair but also illogical, because to run the domestic sphere required the 
woman of the house to interact with the market. The Court found 
Ginsburg’s arguments persuasive and struck down the Idaho statute as 
an “arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.”42 
Around the same time, in Moritz v. C.I.R., representing a man, 
Ginsburg challenged the other side of the stereotype that women should 
be caregivers and men should not, by challenging a federal tax law that 
allowed a caregiving deduction for women but not men.43 Charles Moritz 
was a single, unmarried man who worked full-time as editor of the 
western division of a Philadelphia publishing company.44 His eighty-nine-
year-old mother, who was in a wheelchair due to arthritis and suffered 
from diminished memory and hearing, lived with him and refused to go 
to a nursing home.45 To meet the demands of his job, which required 
extensive travel, he hired a woman to provide care for his mother in his 
absence and paid her a salary and meals.46 At the time, federal tax law 
allowed expenses “for the care of one or more dependents” to be 
deducted “by a taxpayer who is a woman or widower [including women 
and men who are divorced or legally separated], or is a husband whose 
 
 40. Id. at 46. 
 41. Id. at 66. 
 42. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). 
 43. 469 F.2d 466, 467–68 (10th Cir. 1972). 
 44. Id. at 468. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
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wife is incapacitated or is institutionalized . . . but only if such care is for 
the purpose of enabling the taxpayer to be gainfully employed.”47 Thus 
the threshold question the Tenth Circuit had to address was whether it 
was Charles Moritz’s responsibility to provide care for his mother as it 
would have been for any wife, ex-wife, or sister of his.48 
As Ginsburg described it, Moritz wanted a caretaker tax credit to 
which he would have been entitled if he was a “dutiful daughter” instead 
of a never-married “dutiful son.”49 Ironically, in its choice of how to 
defend the statute, the government actually lent support to Moritz’s 
argument by relying firmly on stereotypes of who could provide 
caregiving for dependent family members, arguing that Moritz “did not 
establish that [he] was qualified or able to furnish the type of care 
required . . . [because] his supplying the care himself was not a realistic 
alternative to his being employed.”50 Because he could not prove that he 
would have been the one to care for his mother if he was not working, 
the government argued, he was not entitled to the deduction.51 
In a brief to the Tenth Circuit that bore “a strong resemblance” to 
the appellate brief to the Supreme Court that she filed in Reed,52 
Ginsburg argued that the law was based on a gender stereotype that was 
untrue. “Congress never suggested, nor could any rational person 
believe,” she reasoned, “that the biological differences between sons and 
daughters are related to the activity in question here—provision of care 
for an invalid parent.”53 Citing a dozen prior cases demonstrating that 
courts were “[n]o longer shackled by decisions reflecting social . . . 
conditions or . . . theories of an earlier era,”54 she argued that “[l]egislative 
discrimination grounded on sex, for purposes unrelated to any biological 
or functional difference between the sexes” required the same strict 
scrutiny as discrimination based on race.55 And, while women were the 
usual victims of sex-based stereotypes, “the constitutional sword 
necessarily has two edges: Fair and equal treatment for women means 
fair and equal treatment for members of both sexes.”56 Speaking later of 
the case, she recalled that “in those days,” one “could make the 
assumption that a daughter would be able to care for an elderly parent, 
 
 47. Id. (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 214(a) (1967)). 
 48. Id. at 467–68 (“[W]e need [to] discuss . . . whether . . . the expenses [Moritz] paid for care of 
[his] mother . . . were for the purpose of enabling him to be gainfully employed . . . .”). 
 49. Interview by Williams, supra note 11; see Merritt & Williams, supra note 22, at 809. 
 50. Moritz, 469 F.2d at 469. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Merritt & Williams, supra note 22, at 811. 
 53. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 18, Moritz, 469 F.2d 466 (No. 71-1127). 
 54. Id. at 18. 
 55. Id. at 19. 
 56. Id. at 20. 
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but . . . [not] a son”—that is, “a woman can take care of [a] . . . parent or 
a child, but a man would have to prove he had that ability.”57 Noting that 
the services performed by the caregiver Moritz hired “were in the nature 
of general care and not specialized medical attention which Moritz could 
not give,” the Tenth Circuit agreed, holding that “the denial of the 
deduction to a man who has not married” could not pass constitutional 
muster.58 Because the tax code classification was “premised primarily on 
sex,” the Tenth Circuit applied the equal protection principles as 
established in Reed v. Reed to hold that the statute impermissibly “made 
a special discrimination premised on sex alone”—the stereotype that a 
single man is unqualified to care for an elderly parent.59 
B.  Men and Women as Breadwinners: FRONTIERO V. RICHARDSON and 
CALIFANO V. GOLDFARB 
Following her victories in Reed and Moritz, Ginsburg challenged the 
other side of the problematic coin of separate spheres by tackling laws 
related to the proper roles of men and women as breadwinners. In two 
subsequent cases, Frontiero v. Richardson60 and Califano v. Goldfarb,61 
Ginsburg challenged stereotypes that men, and not women, could be 
breadwinners for their families by arguing that benefits requiring 
husbands, but not wives, to prove financial dependency on their spouses 
also violated equal protection. 
Representing a woman in Frontiero, Ginsburg and the ACLU as 
amicus curiae helped to challenge a federal statute that allowed an 
increased housing allowance and medical benefits for military wives 
regardless of their dependency on their husbands, but for military 
husbands only if they proved financial dependency on their wives.62 Air 
Force Lieutenant Sharron Frontiero applied for an increase in her 
housing allowance and medical and dental benefits for her husband 
Joseph, a veteran and full-time college student.63 Under the federal 
statute providing such benefits (designed “to attract career personnel 
through re-enlistment”), a male servicemember’s wife was automatically 
considered a dependent, while a female servicemember was required to 
 
 57. Merritt & Williams, supra note 22, at 810. 
 58. Moritz, 469 F.2d at 469. By late 1971, after the tax year in question but before the Tenth 
Circuit decision was rendered, the statute was amended to provide the deduction for any “individual 
who maintains a household which includes as a member one or more qualifying [dependents].” Id. at 
468 n.2. 
 59. Id. at 470. 
 60. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
 61. 430 U.S. 199 (1977). 
 62. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 679–81. 
 63. Id. 
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demonstrate that her husband relied on her income for over half of his 
financial support.64 
Again, the approach was to challenge gender stereotypes written 
into the law as sex discrimination in violation of equal protection. The 
brief written by plaintiffs’ counsel65 argued that, while the statute might 
have been “an attempt to guess [the] actual dependency” of husbands 
and wives, “the true basis for this discriminatory legislation can be traced 
to a sex stereotype which predominated in the heyday of the common 
law”—the stereotype of “woman as the dependent homebound wife.”66 
In her amicus brief on behalf of the ACLU, Ginsburg further tied the 
violation to impermissible stereotyping, arguing that the statute “rests 
upon a foundation of . . . custom which assumes that the male is the 
dominant partner . . . and which reinforces restrictive and outdated sex 
role stereotypes about married women and their participation in the 
workforce.”67 Highlighting statistics from the time period that “relegate 
to myth the notions that relatively few married women work, and that 
when they do, their earnings are ‘pin money’ rather than an essential part 
of the family’s finances,” Ginsburg reasoned that the statue “reinforce[d] 
restrictive and outdated sex-role stereotypes and penalize[d] married 
women who do not conform to the assumed general pattern.”68 For 
women like Sharron Frontiero, “[i]n marriage, the wife is presently th[e] 
primary wage-earner; the husband, the ‘assistant breadwinner.’”69 
Again, the Supreme Court agreed with Ginsburg and the plaintiffs, 
striking down the federal law as a violation of equal protection. Writing 
for the plurality, Justice Brennan highlighted the nation’s “long and 
unfortunate history of sex discrimination. . . . rationalized by an attitude 
of ‘romantic paternalism’ which, in practical effect, put women, not on a 
pedestal, but in a cage.”70 In particular, Justice Brennan criticized the 
Court’s 1873 decision in Bradwell v. Illinois, which enshrined separate 
spheres ideology by “proclaim[ing that] . . . . ‘[t]he constitution of the 
family organization . . . founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the 
nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly 
belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood’” and “repugnant to 
the idea of a woman adopting a distinct and independent career from 
 
 64. Id. at 679–80. 
 65. Note that Ginsburg did not author this brief but argued the case as amicus curiae. See 
Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 678 (listing Joseph J. Levin Jr. and Morris S. Dees Jr. as arguing the cause and 
authoring the brief for appellants, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Melvin L. Wulf as arguing the cause 
and authoring the brief for amicus curiae ACLU). 
 66. Brief for Appellants at 59, Frontiero, 411 U.S. 677 (No. 71-1694). 
 67. Brief for Amicus Curiae ACLU at 7, Frontiero, 411 U.S. 677 (No. 71-1694). 
 68. Id. at 24–25. 
 69. Id. at 27. 
 70. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684. 
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that of her husband.”71 Based on these deeply rooted ideas, Justice 
Brennan explained, “our statute books gradually became laden with 
gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes,” such as the law 
Sharron Frontiero challenged.72 Relying on the precedent established in 
Reed, the Court held that the law holding servicewomen to a different 
standard than servicemen to obtain benefits for their families was 
unconstitutional sex discrimination.73 
Shortly thereafter, representing a man in Califano v. Goldfarb, 
Ginsburg mounted a similar challenge to a federal law that provided 
social security survivor benefits for widows regardless of their 
dependency on their husbands, but for widowers only after proving their 
prior financial dependency on their wives.74 Prior to her death, Hannah 
Goldfarb had worked as a secretary for New York City public schools for 
nearly twenty-five years, during which time she paid all required social 
security taxes.75 When her surviving husband Leon, who was retired, 
applied for widower’s benefits, his application was denied because he 
could not prove that he had been receiving over half of his financial 
support from his wife at the time of her death.76 Under the relevant 
federal law, surviving widows were not similarly required to prove 
dependency on their deceased husbands to receive such benefits.77 
As in Frontiero, Ginsburg’s brief argued that relying on gender 
stereotypes that devalued women’s roles as breadwinners was sex 
discrimination in violation of equal protection.78 The social security 
statute at issue, she argued, “assumes gainful employment as a domain in 
which men come first, women second,” which in effect “promote[s] the 
traditional division of labor between men and women” and “retard[s] 
society’s progress toward equal opportunity, free from gender-based 
discrimination.”79 Like the laws held unconstitutional in Reed and 
Frontiero, she reasoned, “statutes that make convenient assumptions 
about ‘the way women (or men) are’” violate the Constitution.80 Quoting 
Congresswoman Martha Griffiths, Ginsburg’s brief highlighted the 
impermissible influence of separate spheres ideology: “The income 
security programs of this nation were designed for a land of male and 
 
 71. Id. at 684–85 (citing Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., 
concurring)). 
 72. Id. at 685. 
 73. Id. at 690–91. 
 74. 430 U.S. 199, 201–02 (1977). 
 75. Id. at 202–03. 
 76. Id. at 203. 
 77. Id. at 201. 
 78. Brief for Appellee, Califano, 430 U.S. 199 (No. 75-699), 1976 WL 181387, at *17. 
 79. Id. at *24. 
 80. Id. 
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female stereotypes, a land where all men were breadwinners and all 
women were wives or widows; where men provided necessary income for 
their families but women did not”—a “view of the world [that] never 
matched reality, but today . . . is further than ever from the truth.”81 
Once again, based in part on the precedent established in Frontiero, 
the Court agreed.82 Noting that the distinction in the federal 
requirements “deprive[s] women of protection for their families which 
men receive as a result of their employment” (that is, deprives Hannah 
Goldfarb’s husband of the social security taxes she had paid out of her 
salary for twenty-five years), the Court held that “the gender-based 
differentiation”83 was unconstitutional.84 The statute was, according to the 
Court, “supported by no more substantial justification than ‘archaic and 
overbroad’ generalizations . . . that are more consistent with ‘the role-
typing society has long imposed,’ than with contemporary reality.”85 In 
striking down the law, the Court held that “such assumptions do not 
suffice to justify a gender-based discrimination in the distribution of 
employment-related benefits.”86 
C.  Mothers and Fathers: WEINBERGER V. WIESENFELD 
The culmination of Ginsburg’s strategy to challenge assumptions 
that men were not proper caregivers and women were not proper 
breadwinners came in the case of Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,87 in which 
Ginsburg challenged both sides of separate spheres stereotypes at once. 
In Wiesenfeld, representing a father whose wife had died in childbirth, 
Ginsburg challenged a federal law that provided social security survivor 
benefits to children and the widows or surviving divorcées who cared for 
them (“mother’s insurance benefits”), but not to widowers.88 When Paula 
Wiesenfeld, a public school teacher and her family’s primary breadwinner, 
died of an embolism after giving birth to a healthy son, her husband 
 
 81. Id. at *28 (quoting Congresswoman Martha Griffiths) (internal quotations omitted). 
 82. Califano, 430 U.S. at 217. 
 83. Id. at 206. 
 84. Id. at 207. 
 85. Id. at 206–07 (citations omitted); cf. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 352–56 (1974) (holding that 
a state statute giving widows a $500 property tax exemption did not violate equal protection where it 
benefitted a certain class based on a reasonable distinction in state policy that did not conflict with the 
Constitution). The Kahn case was the only one out of the six cases that Ginsburg argued before the 
Supreme Court in which she did not prevail. See Von Drehle, supra note 1. Note, however, that 
Ginsburg did not choose to bring this case; it was filed by a local ACLU affiliate without her 
knowledge, and she was brought in for the appeal to the Supreme Court. Id. Because she was 
concerned about the strength of the plaintiff’s case, she argued the case under a rational basis test for 
fear of setting back the effort toward heightened scrutiny for sex-based classifications. Id. 
 86. Califano, 430 U.S. at 217. 
 87. 420 U.S. 636 (1975). 
 88. Id. at 640–41. 
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Stephen applied for and was denied survivor benefits for himself.89 
Stephen was determined to care for his son and not return to work full-
time until his son was in school full-time.90 Had he been a woman, he 
would have been entitled to survivor benefits for himself “as long as he 
was not working,” or, if he was working, offset by an amount based on 
what he earned.91 Because he was a man, however, the benefits were not 
available to him. 
In her lawsuit on his behalf, Ginsburg argued that sex-based 
classifications in employment benefits laws were impermissible when 
women’s contributions as breadwinners were diminished.92 Yet because 
Wiesenfeld involved benefits that would allow mothers to stay home with 
their children, Ginsburg went further here, arguing that denigrating 
men’s contributions as caregivers was also impermissible.93 By 
championing a man who did not conform to gender stereotypes, she 
challenged both breadwinner and caregiver stereotypes simultaneously—
identifying reliance on either as sex discrimination. Ginsburg’s brief to 
the Supreme Court lays out this two-pronged argument clearly: To 
provide survivor benefits to women but not men “reflects the familiar 
stereotype that, throughout this Nation’s history, has operated to devalue 
women’s efforts in the economic sector”;94 likewise, to provide 
“mother’s” insurance benefits but not “father’s” devalues men’s efforts 
in the domestic sector.95 Thus, “[j]ust as Paula Wiesenfeld’s status as a 
breadwinner is devalued,” Ginsburg argued, “so Stephen Wiesenfeld’s 
parental status is denigrated, for [the statute] recognizes the mother, to 
the exclusion of the father, as the nurturing parent.”96 Relying on the 
precedent established in Reed and Frontiero, Ginsburg reasoned that 
“upholding the gender-based criterion [here] would require approval of 
gross sex-role stereotyping as a permissible basis for legislative 
distinction,” violating equal protection.97 “In providing a ‘mother’s 
benefit,’ but no father’s benefit,” Congress legislated based on 
impermissible sex-based assumptions: “breadwinner was synonymous 
with father, child tender with mother.”98 
Consistent with its prior decisions, the Court agreed with Ginsburg 
yet again, striking down the gendered provision of survivor benefits as 
 
 89. Id. at 639–41; Merritt & Williams, supra note 22, at 814. 
 90. Merritt & Williams, supra note 22, at 814–15. 
 91. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 640–41. 
 92. Brief for Appellee at 10–11, Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (No. 73-1892). 
 93. Id. at 16–17. 
 94. Id. at 5. 
 95. Id. at 6. 
 96. Id. at 11–12. 
 97. Id. at 16. 
 98. Id. 
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unconstitutional.99 The Court looked to the statute and its legislative 
history to determine that the benefit was not intended to remedy past 
economic discrimination against women but instead “was intended to 
permit women to elect not to work and to devote themselves to the care 
of children.”100 Having determined this intent, the Court held that the 
sex-based distinction was “entirely irrational” and could not stand:101 
Even in the typical family hypothesized by the Act, in which the 
husband is supporting the family and the mother is caring for the 
children, this result makes no sense. . . . It is no less important for a 
child to be cared for by its sole surviving parent when that parent is 
male rather than female. And a father, no less than a mother, has a 
constitutionally protected right to the “companionship, care, custody, 
and management” of “the children he has sired and raised, [which] 
undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing 
interest, protection.”102 
Here, the issue was not the financial dependency of a wife per se, 
but rather her desire to care for her children rather than work after the 
death of her husband. For the legislature to assume that a man would not 
want similarly to care for his children after his wife died was to write a 
gender stereotype into the law, which the Court held violated equal 
protection.103 
Among the cases she litigated throughout the 1970s, Ginsburg has 
described Wiesenfeld as her favorite because 
Stephen Wiesenfeld was, I thought, the perfect plaintiff. His case 
involved three-fold discrimination. Discrimination against the woman 
as wage earner—her contributions to Social Security did not net for her 
family the same benefits that a man’s contributions did. Discrimination 
against Stephen as a parent, who wanted to care personally for his 
child. And discrimination against the baby, who would have the 
opportunity for the care of the sole surviving parent if the parent were 
female, but not if the parent were male.104 
With this one case, she was able to challenge the parallel limitations that 
result when “the traditional breadwinner/homemaker view of life—the 
notion that it is man’s obligation to earn a living, and woman’s to care for 
the home and children”—is embedded in the law.105 Despite being at the 
helm of the ACLU’s Women’s Rights Project, Ginsburg actually 
represented “numerically more men . . . in the Supreme Court than 
 
 99. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 653 (1975). 
 100. Id. at 648. 
 101. Id. at 650–51. 
 102. Id. at 651–52 (alteration in original) (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)). 
 103. Id. at 652–53. 
 104. Merritt & Williams, supra note 22, at 815. 
 105. Id. at 814. 
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women.”106 Yet this fact is consistent with her conception of sex 
discrimination as the unlawful application of gender stereotypes to men 
and women. And with her many victories, Ginsburg’s vision is reflected 
in the law of sex discrimination today. Wiesenfeld’s case started when a 
colleague of Ginsburg’s read a letter Wiesenfeld had written to a local 
paper about his story, in which he referred to “hearing a lot about 
women’s lib” and, after telling his story, ended his letter with “Tell that 
to Gloria Steinem.”107 But it was Ginsburg who recognized that what had 
happened to him was unlawful—and who convinced the Supreme Court 
to agree that denying the ability of a man to care for his children while 
supporting the ability of a woman to do so is sex discrimination. 
II.  The Law of Gender Stereotyping Under Title VII: Workplace 
Penalties for Gender Nonconformity Are Actionable 
While Ginsburg focused on impermissible sex-based classifications 
in state and federal statutes through the constitutional law of equal 
protection, a parallel jurisprudence of sex discrimination in the 
workplace was developing under Title VII.108 Initial litigation focused on 
explicit sex-based distinctions in workplace hiring, promotion, and 
benefits, including those based on generalizations about the sexes.109 In 
the work-family context, a series of cases held that employers must 
provide the same non-disability-related parental leave benefits to men 
and women (Title VII does permit additional leave to women who are 
birth mothers, solely for the disabling periods of pregnancy).110 From the 
 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 815. 
 108. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)–2000(e)-17 (2010). Ginsburg herself commented on the parallel line of 
cases under Title VII in her brief to the Supreme Court in Reed v. Reed:  
Currently, federal and state measures are beginning to offer relief from discriminatory 
employment practices. Principal measures on the national level [include] . . . Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . . These developments promise some protection of the equal 
right of men and women to pursue the employment for which individual talent and capacity 
best equip them. But important as these federal measures are, their coverage is 
limited . . . . They provide no assistance at all in the many areas apart from employment, as 
in the case at bar for example, where women are relegated to second class status.  
Brief for Appellant, supra note 34, at *11–12. 
 109. See, e.g., Int’l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 211 (1991) (holding that 
excluding women from battery-manufacturing jobs based on concerns for the women’s potential future 
children was sex discrimination under Title VII); City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 
435 U.S. 702, 722–23 (1978) (holding that requiring women to pay more into a pension fund based on 
generalizations of women’s longevity was sex discrimination under Title VII). 
 110. See, e.g., Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 277 (1987); Schafer v. Bd. of 
Pub. Ed. of Pitt., 903 F.2d 243, 248 (3d Cir. 1990); EEOC v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 1988); 
EEOC v. Commonwealth Edison Co., No. 85 C 5637, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18361, at *4 (N.D. Ill. 
July 1, 1985); cf. Johnson v. Univ. of Iowa, 431 F.3d 325, 332 (8th Cir. 2005) (discussing how a 
biological mother and a biological father were not similarly situated for the purpose of comparing 
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late 1980s onward, however, as the understanding of how stereotypes 
operate to result in more subtle forms of discriminatory behavior grew, 
the law evolved. In 1989, in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme 
Court articulated that penalizing employees at work for failing to 
conform to expected gender stereotypes could amount to impermissible 
sex discrimination under Title VII.111 Within ten years, in the 1998 case of 
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshores Services, Inc., the Court ruled that sexual 
harassment of a man by his male coworkers could also amount to sex 
discrimination in violation of Title VII.112 Through these and the cases 
that followed, Title VII jurisprudence defining sex discrimination 
paralleled the definition Ginsburg had established under equal 
protection: Distinctions or penalties at work based on gender 
stereotypes—or an individual’s failure to conform to them—may 
constitute sex discrimination against women and men. 
A.  “Masculine” Women: PRICE WATERHOUSE V. HOPKINS 
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court articulated the 
“gender stereotyping theory” under Title VII: When women are 
penalized at work because they do not conform to expected stereotypes 
of feminine behavior—how women should look or behave—that is 
evidence of unlawful sex discrimination.113 Ann Hopkins had worked 
successfully as a senior manager in the Washington, D.C. office of 
national accounting firm Price Waterhouse for five years when she was 
proposed for firm partnership.114 At the time (1982), only seven of the 
firm’s 662 partners were women, and Hopkins was the only woman out 
of eighty-eight proposed for partnership that year.115 Hopkins’s work 
contributions in the year prior to the partnership proposal were 
unmatched by any of the other candidates; several partners “praised her 
character as well as her accomplishments, describing her . . . as ‘an 
outstanding professional’ . . . [with] a ‘deft touch,’ a ‘strong character, 
independence and integrity.’”116 Yet she also had critics, who faulted her 
for “abrasiveness,” “brusqueness,” and a lack of “interpersonal skills,”117 
which made her at times “overly aggressive, unduly harsh, difficult to 
 
their leave under Title VII). 
 111. 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989). 
 112. 523 U.S. 75, 81–82 (1998). 
 113. 490 U.S. at 250 (“In the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the 
basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of 
gender.”). 
 114. Id. at 233. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 234. 
 117. Id. at 236. 
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work with and impatient.”118 When a decision on the proposal to make 
her a partner was put on hold for a year and then ultimately denied, she 
sued for sex discrimination under Title VII.119 
Evidence showed that criticism of Hopkins related to the fact that 
she was a woman: Had she been a man, she would not have been faulted 
equally (in fact she may have been praised) for her behavior.120 As the 
Supreme Court recounted in its decision: “One partner described her as 
‘macho’; another suggested that she ‘overcompensated for being a 
woman’; a third advised her to take ‘a course at charm school.’”121 When 
told she would not make partner, Hopkins was told that “to improve her 
chances for partnership . . . [she] should ‘walk more femininely, talk 
more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair 
styled, and wear jewelry.’”122 While Hopkins was an outstanding achiever, 
she was faulted for not performing her gender in a way that matched a 
sex-based stereotype of how women should behave. Other female 
candidates for partnership “were viewed favorably if partners believed 
they maintained their femin[in]ity while becoming effective professional 
managers”; the problem was not necessarily that Hopkins was a woman, 
but that she was not a feminine woman in a workplace where “[t]o be 
identified as a ‘women’s lib[b]er’ was regarded as [a] negative comment.”123 
As the Court explained, the criticisms of Hopkins “stemmed from an 
impermissibly cabined view of the proper behavior of women,”124 and, by 
“giving . . . effect to . . . comments that resulted from sex stereotyping,” 
Price Waterhouse “unlawfully discriminated against Hopkins on the 
basis of sex.”125 Citing early Title VII precedent from the 1970s, the Court 
made its view explicit: 
As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day 
when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting 
that they matched the stereotype associated with their group, for “[i]n 
forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their 
sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate 
treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.”126 
 
 118. Id. at 234–35. 
 119. Id. at 231–32. 
 120. Id. at 251 (“An employer who objects to aggressiveness in women but whose positions require 
this trait places women in an intolerable and impermissible catch 22: out of a job if they behave 
aggressively and out of a job if they do not. Title VII lifts women out of this bind.”). 
 121. Id. at 235 (citations omitted). 
 122. Id. (quoting Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1117 (D.D.C. 1985)). 
 123. Id. at 236 (alterations in original) (quoting Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 
1117 (D.D.C. 1985)). 
 124. Id. at 236–37. 
 125. Id. at 237. 
 126. Id. at 251 (alteration in original) (quoting City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 
435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)). 
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To help establish the link between gender stereotypes and the 
actions taken against Hopkins, her attorneys provided expert testimony 
from a social psychologist about how “the partnership selection process 
at Price Waterhouse was likely influenced by sex stereotyping.”127 Yet, 
writing for the plurality, Justice Brennan noted that “[i]t takes no special 
training to discern sex stereotyping in a description of an aggressive 
female employee as requiring ‘a course at charm school’” and that, “if an 
employee’s flawed ‘interpersonal skills’ can be corrected by a soft-hued 
suit or a new shade of lipstick,” it is likely her sex that is the basis for the 
criticism, “motivated by stereotypical notions about women’s proper 
deportment.”128 Writing separately in a concurrence, Justice O’Connor 
went even further to identify that the stereotypical comments constituted 
direct evidence that sex discrimination played a significant role in the 
denial of Hopkins’s partnership—meaning the comments were themselves 
sex discrimination, without the factfinder having to draw an inference.129 
As it had done in the equal protection cases of the 1970s, here the 
Supreme Court established that, in the context of Title VII, embedding 
gender stereotypes and penalizing individuals for failing to conform to 
them may constitute sex discrimination.130 
B. “Feminine” Men: ONCALE V. SUNDOWNER OFFSHORE SERVICES, INC. 
A decade after Price Waterhouse, in the 1998 case of Oncale v. 
Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., the Supreme Court established that 
when a man is sexually harassed at work by other men, he may claim 
actionable sex discrimination.131 Joseph Oncale was working as a 
roustabout on an all-male crew on an oil platform in the Gulf of Mexico 
when he was “forcibly subjected to sex-related, humiliating actions” by 
and in front of his male coworkers, “physically assaulted . . . in a sexual 
manner, and . . . threatened . . . with rape.”132 After his complaints to his 
 
 127. Id. at 235. 
 128. Id. at 256. 
 129. Id. at 275, 277 (O’Connor, J. concurring). As Justice O’Connor described it in her concurrence:  
It is as if Ann Hopkins were sitting in the hall outside the room where partnership decisions 
were being made. As the partners filed in to consider her candidacy, she heard several of 
them make sexist remarks in discussing her suitability for partnership. As the 
decisionmakers exited the room, she was told by one of those privy to the decisionmaking 
process that her gender was a major reason for the rejection of her partnership bid.  
Id. at 272–73. 
 130. Id. at 251–52 (majority opinion). While the Court noted that stereotypical remarks “do not 
inevitably prove that gender played a part in a particular employment decision” and that a “plaintiff 
must show that the employer actually relied on her gender in making its decision,” it held that 
“stereotyped remarks can certainly be evidence that gender played a part.” Id. at 251. 
 131. 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998). 
 132. Id. at 77. 
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supervisors and his employer’s safety compliance clerk went nowhere 
and fearing that, if he did not leave, he “would be raped or forced to 
have sex,” he eventually quit, with the request that his records show 
“that he ‘voluntarily left due to sexual harassment and verbal abuse.’”133 
When Oncale sued for sex discrimination under Title VII, the trial 
and appellate courts ruled against him, relying on prior cases that held 
that, as a male, “Oncale . . . has no cause of action under Title VII for 
harassment by male co-workers.”134 Citing precedent establishing that 
sexual harassment amounted to discrimination under Title VII and that 
Title VII protected men as well as women and regardless of whether “the 
plaintiff and the defendant . . . are of the same sex,”135 a unanimous 
Supreme Court disagreed.136 Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia 
explained that, although male-on-male harassment was not the principal 
objective of Congress in enacting Title VII, “statutory prohibitions often 
go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils.”137 
Thus, while “[c]ourts and juries have found the inference of 
discrimination easy to draw in most male-female sexual harassment 
situations,” he reasoned, “harassing conduct need not be motivated by 
sexual desire to support an inference of discrimination on the basis of 
sex.”138 Under this holding, the Court explained, a factfinder “might 
reasonably find such discrimination” if a victim is harassed by a harasser 
of the same sex but “in such sex-specific and derogatory terms . . . as to 
make it clear that the harasser is motivated by general hostility to the 
presence of [the victim’s sex] in the workplace.”139 
Despite the fact that Joseph Oncale was a married, heterosexual 
man with two children, the Court held that, when he was singled out and 
harassed by other men in a sexually derogatory manner, this was 
actionable discrimination “because of sex” under Title VII.140 Indeed, as 
Oncale argued in his brief, “there is no type of conduct more repulsive to 
the nonconsenting heterosexual male and more certain to drive him from 
the work place than that engaged in by the defendants in this case.”141 
The conduct was “degrading and humiliating” specifically “because of 
[Oncale’s] sexual identity as a man.”142 In recognizing that sexual 
 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 79. 
 136. Id. at 75, 78–79. 
 137. Id. at 79. 
 138. Id. at 80. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 82. 
 141. Brief for Petitioner, Oncale, 523 U.S. 75 (No. 96-568), 1997 WL 458826, at *19. 
 142. Id. 
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harassment whereby men denigrate and threaten another man’s sexuality 
could be actionable sex discrimination, the Court signaled its agreement.143 
C. Title VII Gender Stereotyping Today: The Progeny of PRICE 
WATERHOUSE and ONCALE 
In the wake of Price Waterhouse and Oncale, the law of gender 
stereotyping and harassment under Title VII has evolved to hold that the 
gender stereotyping theory under Title VII applies to men, too. Under 
the law of Title VII today, when a man is penalized or harassed at work 
for failing to conform to a gender stereotype of masculine behavior, he 
can allege that he has been discriminated against because of sex. While a 
full discussion of the development of this case law is beyond the scope of 
this Article,144 several key cases highlight the progression of the Title VII 
gender stereotyping theory and provide examples of the protections it 
affords to men for failure to conform to masculine norms. 
Predating the Oncale decision by a year, in the 1997 case Doe v. City 
of Belleville, the Seventh Circuit applied Price Waterhouse to hold that 
harassing a man because his appearance or behavior did not conform to 
male stereotypes constituted impermissible harassment because of sex 
under Title VII.145 Twin brothers sued for sex discrimination in violation 
of Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause after being “subjected to a 
 
 143. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81–82 (“Whatever evidentiary route the plaintiff chooses to follow, he or she 
must always prove that the conduct at issue was not merely tinged with offensive sexual connotations, but 
actually constituted ‘discrimina[tion] . . . because of . . . sex.’” (alterations in original)). While Oncale may 
not have been a “feminine” man, clearly targeted for harassment based on his outward gender 
nonconformity, the harassment he endured was a way of “feminizing” him—denigrating him by 
treating him as a woman. News accounts of the case note clearly that Oncale was a married 
heterosexual man with two children; yet he also went by the nickname “Jody” and was smaller in 
stature, five feet, four inches and 140 pounds. See Dorothy Atcheson, Assault with a Sexual Weapon, 
Out, Dec./Jan. 1997–1998, at 42, 44. 
 144. For discussion of the development of this case law over time, including the limitations of this 
theory as applied in the context of sexual orientation and dress and appearance codes, see, for 
example, Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The 
Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 Yale L.J. 1, 2–3 (1995); Joel Wm. 
Friedman, Gender Nonconformity and the Unfulfilled Promise of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 
14 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol’y 205 (2007); Jonathan A. Hardage, Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant 
Enterprises, Inc., and the Legacy of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: Does Title VII Prohibit 
“Effeminacy” Discrimination?, 54 Ala. L. Rev. 193 (2002); Stephen J. Nathans, Twelve Years After 
Price Waterhouse and Still No Success for “Hopkins in Drag”: The Lack of Protection for the Male 
Victim of Gender Stereotyping Under Title VII, 46 Vill. L. Rev. 713, 713–14 (2001); cf. Philip 
McGough, Same-Sex Harassment: Do Either Price Waterhouse or Oncale Support the Ninth Circuit’s 
Holding in Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc. That Same-Sex Harassment Based on Failure 
to Conform to Gender Stereotypes is Actionable? 22 Hofstra Lab. & Emp. L.J. 206 (2004); Colleen 
Keating, Extending Title VII Protection to Non-Gender-Conforming Men, Modern Am., Fall 2008, at 
82. 
 145. 119 F.3d 563, 566 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded in light of Oncale v. Sundowner 
Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
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relentless campaign of harassment by their male coworkers” at their 
summer landscaping job for Belleville.146 One of the brothers, referred to 
as “H. Doe” and who wore an earring, was particularly subjected to 
gender-based harassment including being called “fag,” “queer,” or 
“bitch,” asked whether he was a boy or a girl, being threatened with 
sexual assault “out [in] the woods,” and, after one coworker announced, 
“I’m going to finally find out if you are a girl or a guy,” being pinned 
against a wall and grabbed by the testicles.147 Relying on Price 
Waterhouse, the Seventh Circuit held that this constituted sex 
discrimination as H. Doe “was singled out for . . . abuse because the way 
in which he projected the sexual aspect of his personality (. . . his gender) 
did not conform to his coworkers’ view of appropriate masculine 
behavior.”148 Thus, just as Price Waterhouse’s “reliance upon gender 
stereotypes” to deny Ann Hopkins partnership was because of her sex, 
the harassment H. Doe endured was also because of his sex.149 The 
Seventh Circuit explained,  
[A] man who is harassed because his voice is soft, his physique is slight, 
his hair is long, or because in some other respect he exhibits his 
masculinity in a way that does not meet his coworkers’ idea of how men 
are to appear and behave, is harassed “because of” his sex.150  
Whether a plaintiff is male or female, the court continued, the analysis 
should be the same: “The question in both cases is whether a particular 
action . . . can be attributed to sex,” and “reliance upon stereotypical 
notions about how men and women should appear and behave . . . 
reasonably suggests that the answer to that question is yes.”151 
Five years later, the Ninth Circuit applied Price Waterhouse and 
Oncale in two cases that again extended gender stereotyping and sexual 
harassment theories under Title VII to men. In 2001, in Nichols v. Azteca 
Restaurant Enterprises, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held (like the Seventh 
Circuit had in Doe v. Belleville) that a man who was harassed for failing 
to meet a stereotype of masculinity could allege sex discrimination under 
Title VII.152 Antonio Sanchez, who worked as a restaurant host and food 
server, was “subjected to a relentless campaign of insults, name-calling, 
and vulgarities” by his male coworkers and even a supervisor, who 
“referred to Sanchez . . . as ‘she’ and ‘her,’” criticized him “for walking 
 
 146. Id.  
 147. Id. at 566–67. 
 148. Id. at 580. 
 149. Id. at 580–81 (“Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins makes clear that Title VII does not permit an 
employee to be treated adversely because his . . . conduct does not conform to stereotypical gender 
roles.” (citation omitted)). 
 150. Id. at 581 (emphasis added).  
 151. Id. at 575, 581. 
 152. 256 F.3d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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and carrying his serving tray ‘like a woman,’” and called him, among 
other things, a “female whore.”153 Relying on Price Waterhouse and 
Oncale, the Ninth Circuit agreed with Sanchez that “he was harassed 
because he failed to conform to a male stereotype” and that “the holding 
in Price Waterhouse applies with equal force to a man who is 
discriminated against for acting too feminine.”154 The next year, in Rene 
v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that another man, who 
was gay, was also subject to sex discrimination based on sexual 
harassment: His sexual orientation was irrelevant where his harassment 
was sufficiently sex-based to violate Title VII.155 Medina Rene, who 
worked as a “butler” for “wealthy, high-profile” hotel guests, was 
harassed almost daily for two years by his male coworkers, who called 
him “sweetheart” and “muñeca” (“doll”) and subjected him to “offensive 
physical conduct of a sexual nature,” including caressing, hugging, and 
“touch[ing his] body like they would to a woman.”156 Here the majority 
focused on Oncale,157 noting that “Oncale did not need to show that he 
was treated worse than members of the opposite sex. It was enough to 
show that he suffered discrimination in comparison to other men.”158 
Likewise, Rene “was singled out from his other male co-workers for this 
treatment,” and “treated differently—and disadvantageously—based on 
sex,” which is “precisely what Title VII forbids.”159 
Most recently, in 2011 in Glenn v. Brumby, the Eleventh Circuit 
applied these and related precedents and joined a number of other 
federal courts to hold that firing a transgendered employee because of 
the employee’s transition from one gender to another was penalizing the 
employee for gender nonconformity and, therefore, unlawful sex 
discrimination.160 When Vandiver Elizabeth Glenn, who was born a 
biological male, was fired from her job with a state agency because of her 
intended gender transition from male to female, she sued for sex 
discrimination in violation of equal protection.161 The Eleventh Circuit 
 
 153. Id. at 870. 
 154. Id. at 874. 
 155. 305 F.3d 106i, 1063–64 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 156. Id. at 1064. 
 157. In addition, the concurrence, citing Price Waterhouse, said the case presented “actionable 
gender stereotyping harassment” and was “indistinguishable” from Nichols. Id. at 1068 (Pregerson, J., 
concurring). 
 158. Id. at 1067 (majority opinion). 
 159. Id.  
 160. 663 F.3d 1312, 1314, 1316–18 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing similar holdings from the First, Sixth, and 
Ninth Circuits and district courts in Arizona, New York, Pennsylvania, Texas, and the District of 
Columbia); see Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2004) (explaining how Price 
Waterhouse “eviscerated” prior holdings to the contrary in the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits). 
 161. Id. at 1313–14. As a public employee, Glenn brought her claim as a constitutional violation of 
equal protection under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, rather than under Title VII, but the analysis is applicable to 
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held that “discriminating against someone on the basis of his or her 
gender non-conformity constitutes sex-based discrimination.”162 To reach 
its holding, the court drew upon a wide swath of precedent defining sex 
discrimination, citing not only Price Waterhouse, Oncale, Doe v. Belleville, 
and Nichols, but also the early cases litigated by Ginsburg, including 
Frontiero and Wiesenfeld. As the court explained: 
  All persons . . . are protected from discrimination on the basis of 
gender stereotype. For example, courts have held that plaintiffs cannot 
be discriminated against for wearing jewelry that was considered too 
effeminate, carrying a serving tray too gracefully, or taking too active a 
role in child-rearing. An individual cannot be punished because of his 
or her perceived gender-nonconformity. . . . The nature of the 
discrimination is the same; it may differ in degree but not in kind, and 
discrimination on this basis is a form of sex-based discrimination . . . .163 
Surveying the field, the court emphasized that penalizing an 
employee for gender nonconformity—including in the context of child 
rearing164—is sex discrimination based on sex stereotyping. Harkening 
back to Ginsburg’s initial vision, the court noted, “Ever since the 
Supreme Court began to apply heightened scrutiny to sex-based 
classifications, its consistent purpose has been to eliminate discrimination 
on the basis of gender stereotypes.”165 
III.  The Law of Gender Stereotyping Under the FMLA: Work, 
Family, and Entrenched Gender Stereotypes 
Advances in gender equality through challenges to sex-based 
stereotypes in statutes and in the workplace were sparked by Ginsburg’s 
equal protection cases and furthered by Title VII jurisprudence in Price 
Waterhouse, Oncale, and their progeny. Yet while antidiscrimination law 
made holding men and women to gender-based stereotypes unlawful in 
the market sphere, rooting out stereotypes tied to the domestic sphere 
proved more difficult. The passage of the FMLA in 1993,166 which 
provides job-protected leave for both women and men to care for new 
children or seriously ill children or family members, was designed to 
help. With its subsequent interpretation of the FMLA in Nevada 
Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, the Supreme Court made the 
link between equal protection, Title VII, the FMLA, and gender 
 
Title VII cases as well. See id. at 1321 (“[There is] ample direct evidence to support the . . . conclusion 
that [Glenn’s employer] acted on the basis of Glenn’s gender non-conformity [so that] [i]f this were a 
Title VII case, the analysis would end here.”). 
 162. Id. at 1316. 
 163. Id. at 1318–19 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
 164. See infra Parts III, IV. 
 165. Glenn, 663 F.3d at 1319. 
 166. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2010). 
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stereotypes around work and family clear.167 Like equal protection and 
Title VII prohibitions against sex discrimination, the FMLA was 
designed to rid the workplace of gender stereotypes, particularly where 
those stereotypes remain strongly entrenched at the intersection of work 
and family.168 
A.  Parallel Stereotypes of Breadwinner and Caregiver: NEVADA 
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES V. HIBBS 
The FMLA provides certain employees, both men and women, who 
work for a covered employer with up to twelve weeks of unpaid, job-
protected family and medical leave to care for a new child; a seriously ill 
child, parent, or spouse; or the employee’s own serious health 
condition.169 A decade after the FMLA’s passage, in Hibbs, the Supreme 
Court faced the question of whether a state employee could sue his 
employer for monetary damages under the FMLA.170 In answering this 
question, the Court highlighted the role of sex stereotypes at the 
intersection of work and family in the persistence of gender inequality at 
work.171 
Williams Hibbs was a social worker in his state’s Department of 
Human Services when his wife, Dianne, was severely injured in a car 
accident, requiring neck surgery that left her addicted to pain 
medication, clinically depressed, and, at one point, suicidal.172 Her 
doctors recommended a second surgery to correct problems from a metal 
plate that had been inserted in her neck and recommended “personal 
care by her husband in the interim.”173 Hibbs was granted twelve weeks 
of intermittent FMLA leave but was later ordered to return to work and 
terminated when he failed to do so.174 When he sued for violation of the 
FMLA, the district court granted summary judgment against him based 
on Eleventh Amendment immunity barring such a suit against a state 
employer; the Ninth Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court affirmed.175 
The question turned on “whether Congress acted within its constitutional 
 
 167. See 538 U.S. 721, 735–37 (2003). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Covered employers include private employers with fifty or more employees and all public 
agencies, including local, state, and federal employers and public schools. Eligible employees include 
those who have worked for over one year and for 1250 hours in the prior year to their leave, and who 
work at a worksite with fifty or more employees in a seventy-five mile radius. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–
2654; U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Fact Sheet #28: The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, at 1 (2010). 
 170. 538 U.S. at 721, 736–37. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 725; Brief for Respondent, Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (No. 01-1368), 2002 WL 31655020 at *6. 
 173. Brief for Respondent, supra note 172, at *6–7. 
 174. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 725. 
 175. Id. at 725, 740. 
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authority when it sought to abrogate the States’ immunity [and allow 
lawsuits against state employers] for purposes of the FMLA’s family-
leave provision.”176 To answer this question required determining the 
legislative intent behind the FMLA. 
In her brief to the Supreme Court on Hibbs’s behalf, attorney and 
law professor Cornelia Pillard highlighted how the FMLA was enacted to 
remedy sex discrimination and “specifically targets the very stereotypes 
about family and work that this Court has long recognized as a basis for 
its own heightened scrutiny of sex-based classifications.”177 In a section 
entitled “The FMLA Responds to Unconstitutional Sex Discrimination 
as This Court Defines It” and citing precedent from Ginsburg’s equal 
protection cases, including Frontiero, Pillard explained: 
This Court’s equal protection jurisprudence is designed to bar state 
reliance on “outdated misconceptions concerning the role of females in 
the home rather than in the ‘marketplace and world of ideas,’” and to 
uproot the correlative sex bias against men when they are presumptively 
cast as family “breadwinners.” In recognition of the pervasive part that 
sex-role stereotypes, particularly those about work and family roles, 
have played in maintaining inequality between men and women, this 
Court skeptically scrutinizes discrimination not just against females, 
but against males as well. When States treat female and male 
employees differently due to sex-based assumptions about their family 
responsibilities, they violate the Equal Protection Clause as this Court 
has interpreted it.178 
Paralleling Ginsburg’s use of male plaintiffs in the 1970s equal protection 
cases, here too a male plaintiff illustrated the goal behind the FMLA: to 
provide family leave to men and women equally to reduce gender 
stereotypes about the division of family care that perpetuate sex 
discrimination. 
Agreeing with the plaintiff, the Court held that because Congress 
enacted the FMLA to remedy a proven history of States’ reliance on “the 
pervasive sex-role stereotype that caring for family members is women’s 
work” in their administration of family leave benefits, Congress had 
acted validly (within its enforcement powers in Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment) to enforce equal protection.179 Writing for the 
majority, Justice Rehnquist described in detail the relationship between 
gender stereotyping and the intersection of work and family: 
 
 176. Id. at 726–27. 
 177. Brief for Respondent, supra note 172, at *11. 
 178. Id. at *22 (citations omitted) (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 190–99 (1976), and 
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 681 (1973)). 
 179. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 725–27, 731. A full discussion of the Eleventh Amendment issues is beyond 
the scope of this Article. For a more detailed discussion, see Joan C. Williams, Hibbs as a Federalism 
Case; Hibbs as a Maternal Wall Case, 73 U. Cin. L. Rev. 365 (2004). 
Bornstein_63-HLJ-1297 (Do Not Delete) 6/24/2012 8:26 PM 
June 2012] THE LAW OF GENDER STEREOTYPING 1323 
 
  The impact of the discrimination targeted by the FMLA is 
significant. . . . Stereotypes about women’s domestic roles are 
reinforced by parallel stereotypes presuming a lack of domestic 
responsibilities for men. Because employers continued to regard the 
family as the woman’s domain, they often denied men similar 
accommodations or discouraged them from taking leave. These 
mutually reinforcing stereotypes created a self-fulfilling cycle of 
discrimination that forced women to continue to assume the role of 
primary family caregiver, and fostered employers’ stereotypical views 
about women’s commitment to work and their value as employees.180 
Given the intractable problem of separate spheres stereotyping that 
had not been resolved adequately by the passage of Title VII and its 
amendment to clearly prohibit pregnancy discrimination, Rehnquist 
explained, Congress enacted the FMLA to remove the stigma of 
caregiving solely from women employees, “thereby reducing employers’ 
incentives to engage in discrimination by basing hiring and promotion 
decisions on stereotypes.”181 The FMLA was a federal law “narrowly 
targeted at the faultline between work and family—precisely where sex-
based overgeneralization has been and remains strongest.”182 Once again, 
as it had done in the equal protection and Title VII cases, in Hibbs the 
Court identified sex-based stereotypes as at the root of the sex 
discrimination the FMLA sought to remedy.183 
B.  Gender Stereotyping in FMLA Cases Brought by Male 
Caregivers  
The Court’s interpretation in Hibbs that the legislative intent behind 
the FMLA was to root out gender stereotypes in family caregiving is 
reflected in the evidence in FMLA lawsuits brought by male caregivers. 
To allege a violation of the FMLA, a man who is penalized at work for 
taking family caregiving leave must prove that he is protected by the Act 
(an “eligible employee” working for a “covered employer”) and that his 
employer either interfered with his ability to take entitled leave or 
discriminated or retaliated against him for doing so; he need not prove 
any intentional sex discrimination by his employer.184 Yet as cases 
brought by male plaintiffs under the FMLA demonstrate, the penalties 
they experience at work for taking a caregiving leave often reflect hostility 
to their transgressing the gender stereotype of man as breadwinner.185 
 
 180. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736. 
 181. Id. at 736–37. 
 182. Id. at 738. 
 183. Id. at 736–38. 
 184. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2010). 
 185. For a discussion of male caregiving as a stereotype “transgression,” see Laura T. Kessler, 
Transgressive Caregiving, 33 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1 (2005). 
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Many such cases provide direct evidence of gender stereotyping where a 
man has sought caregiving leave—usually statements that women, and not 
men, should be doing the family caregiving. 
The examples abound: An airline maintenance parts foreman who 
sought intermittent FMLA leave to care for his newborn was told to let 
his wife take care of the baby because he “ha[d] a shop to run.”186 A 
police officer who had taken FMLA leave for the births of his three 
children was passed over for promotions given to lower-ranking officers 
multiple times; supervisors had repeatedly derided him in front of his 
peers, including one who said, “Congratulations for taking the most time 
off for having a baby and not actually having the baby.”187 An accountant 
who asked for FMLA leave for the birth of his child was told he could 
not take leave if his employer was “really busy” and that he did not have 
the same rights to leave as his female colleagues.188 When an equipment 
operator’s wife, step-daughter, and infant son all developed serious 
medical conditions and the operator requested FMLA leave, a supervisor 
asked why the mother or “real father” of his step-daughter could not 
take care of her—she had brain cancer.189 And when a lumber company 
manager trainee requested FMLA to care for his sick father, his 
supervisor warned the trainee he would be “cutting his own throat” if he 
took the leave; when the trainee did, he was fired.190 
Other examples show men who sought caregiving leave being 
“feminized” by the same types of stereotypes that working mothers 
experience: that they are unreliable, uncommitted, and that work and 
family are incompatible.191 An aircraft mechanic was disciplined and then 
 
 186. Beyst v. Pinnacle Airlines, Inc., No. 07-10927, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45468, at *34–36 (E.D. 
Mich. June 11, 2008). In addition to his FMLA claims, Beyst also brought a claim of gender 
discrimination in violation of state law, based on the direct evidence of his supervisor’s statement: “Let 
your wife take care of your kid. You have a shop to run.” Id. at *34. The court held that this statement 
was not sufficient direct evidence to prove his claim and that he had not properly pled a circumstantial 
case of gender discrimination. Id. at *34–39. 
 187. Wells v. City of Montgomery, No. 1:04CV425, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23013, at *5–8 (S.D. 
Ohio Apr. 25, 2006). 
 188. Rabe v. Nationwide Logistics, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1073 (E.D. Mo. 2008). 
 189. Aldridge v. Indian Elec. Coop., No. 07-CV-633-HDC-PJC, 2008 WL 1777480., at *1, *5 (N.D. 
Okla. Apr. 17, 2008). 
 190. Final Brief of the Appellee, Bates v. 84 Lumber Co., 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 23640 (6th Cir. 
Sept. 14, 2006) (No. 04-6493, 05-5544, 05-5736), 2005 U.S. 6th Cir. Briefs LEXIS 297 at *2. 
 191. See, e.g., Drew v. Plaza Constr. Corp., No. 09 Civ. 2129 (VM), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8699, at 
*3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2010) (describing how a system support technician on FMLA leave to care for 
his father with leukemia was asked why his father needed so much attention and was told by a 
supervisor “you’re killing us”); Viera v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. CV-07-5010-EFS, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 15621, at *7–8 (E.D. Wash. Feb. 27, 2009) (involving a cashier who was called “unreliable” for 
taking FMLA leave to care for his children during his wife’s high-risk pregnancy); Rhoades v. Stewart 
Enters., Inc., No. 01-5044, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 550, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 2003) (describing how a 
salesperson who requested a day of sick leave because his mother was “gravely ill” was terminated 
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terminated after using FMLA leave to care for his pregnant wife, who 
suffered from gestational diabetes, because of his “lack of 
dependability.”192 A store operations manager’s supervisor said he had 
“lost confidence” in the manager because he took a week of FMLA leave 
during the store’s biannual inventory period; the inventory occurred two 
days after the birth of the manager’s baby, while his wife and newborn 
were still in the hospital due to delivery complications.193 A carpenter on 
FMLA leave to care for his father who was recovering from a heart 
attack was told after being fired that it was “because no one wanted to 
work with him.”194 And a waste management company laborer and 
divorced father of three was told, after encountering resistance to 
requests for FMLA leave to care for his son with hemophilia, that “he 
had to decide what was more important: his job or his family.”195 
The evidence presented in these cases shows that FMLA violations 
and retaliation against men are often an expression of gender stereotyping 
at work: The idea that being an active family caregiver is inconsistent 
with what it means to be a good breadwinner and man. Because the 
FMLA explicitly includes men as eligible employees and does not 
require proving discriminatory intent, men seeking to challenge penalties 
at work based on their caregiving responsibilities at home most often 
bring such lawsuits under the FMLA.196 Yet about forty percent of the 
U.S. workforce does not meet the requirements to be covered by the 
FMLA.197 Moreover, failing to recognize that workplace penalties against 
men for not conforming to a male gender stereotype of unencumbered 
breadwinner is sex discrimination is failing to address the other half of 
the two-sided coin of separate spheres ideology. For this reason, the next 
Part argues, these plaintiffs—and others like them—could have alleged 
sex discrimination in violation of Title VII in addition to their claims 
under the FMLA.198 
 
over the phone for “lacking commitment to his job”; the plaintiff alleged federal and state race, age, 
and disability discrimination claims as well). 
 192. Meyer v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 08 C 0599, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11114, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 
Feb. 15, 2009). 
 193. Blohm v. Dillard’s, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 2d 473, 476–77 (E.D.N.C. 2000). 
 194. Morgeson v. OK Interiors Corp., No. 1:06-cv-21, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48581, at *2 (S.D. 
Ohio July 3, 2007). 
 195. Scott v. Allied Waste Serv. of Bucks-Mont, No. 10-105, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136202, at *17 
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 23, 2010) (alleging federal and state disability discrimination and association claims as 
well). 
 196. See Cynthia Thomas Calvert, The Ctr. for WorkLife Law, Family Responsibilities 
Discrimination: Litigation Update 2010, at 10–11 (2010). 
 197. See Phillips, supra note 9. 
 198. See infra Part IV.C. 
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IV.  Title VII Gender Stereotyping Theory as a Remedy for the 
Work-Family Conflicts of Men 
As discussed in Parts I through III, three strands of jurisprudence 
have established what constitutes sex discrimination based on gender 
stereotypes: (1) statutes that embed sex-based stereotypes of women as 
caregivers and men as breadwinners are sex discrimination in violation of 
equal protection; (2) workplace sanctions or sexual harassment of 
women and men for failing to conform to gender stereotypes of proper 
feminine or masculine behavior are sex discrimination under Title VII; 
and (3) protections for family caregiving leave under the FMLA were 
intended to remedy sex discrimination based on our most entrenched 
stereotypes around work and family. Over the past decade, a fourth 
strand of law combining several of these theories has emerged: caregiver 
discrimination (also known as “family responsibilities discrimination” or 
“FRD”). While the field of caregiver discrimination encompasses a 
number of existing legal theories, at the heart of this jurisprudence is the 
recognition that penalizing or harassing working women based on gender 
stereotypes of mothers as incompetent or uncommitted is also sex 
discrimination.199 This is, once again, courts recognizing that when 
employers take action based on gender stereotypes around work and 
family—in this case, stereotypes that because women should be caregivers, 
they are inadequate breadwinners—this constitutes sex discrimination. 
The field of caregiver discrimination applies to men as well, consistent 
with Supreme Court precedent labeling as sex discrimination both policies 
embedding stereotypes that keep men out of the domestic sphere (for 
example, in Moritz, Wiesenfeld, and Hibbs) and workplace penalties 
against men for failing to conform to masculine norms (for example, in 
Price Waterhouse, Oncale, and their progeny). Under current Title VII 
gender stereotyping case law and doctrine, this Part argues, men may 
now allege sex discrimination when they are penalized at work for 
participating in family caregiving, even without attaching their Title VII 
claim to other caregiving claims (like violations of the FMLA). In the 
terms of stereotyping law, a man who is penalized at work for failing to 
conform to the masculine stereotype of man as breadwinner and not 
caregiver—who is viewed as “defectively masculine”200 or “effeminate” 
because he takes an active role in caring for his children or family 
members—can now allege a Price Waterhouse-style Title VII sex 
discrimination lawsuit using a gender stereotyping theory. While the 
 
 199. See Calvert, supra note 196, at 6–7; Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, The Evolution 
of “FReD”: Family Responsibilities Discrimination and Developments in the Law of Stereotyping and 
Implicit Bias, 59 Hastings L.J. 1311, 1331 (2008). 
 200. See Joan C. Williams, Reshaping the Work-Family Debate: Why Men and Class Matter 
79–91 (2010). 
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EEOC and a handful of plaintiffs have recognized this theory,201 many 
courts (and even many plaintiffs’ attorneys) have not. A wider 
recognition and application of this theory has the potential to protect 
caregiving men who are not covered by the FMLA. Moreover, it has the 
potential to fully realize Ginsburg’s vision for remedying sex 
discrimination by rooting out both of the gender stereotypes embedded 
in the ideology of separate spheres. 
A.  Stereotyping Mothers as Poor Workers 
Caregiver discrimination cases encompass a range of legal theories 
tied to penalties at work for caregiving responsibilities at home, including 
claims under Title VII, the FMLA, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
state statutes, and common law.202 Yet underlying all of these claims is 
the operation of sex-based stereotypes around work and family: the idea 
that being a good employee is incongruous with being a good mother or 
family caregiver.203  
1.  Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free School District 
The 2004 case Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free School 
District, viewed as a key case in caregiver discrimination jurisprudence, 
made clear that stereotyping of mothers is unlawful sex stereotyping.204 In 
Back, the Second Circuit established that penalizing an employee based 
on gender stereotypes of mothers as uncommitted (more caregiver than 
breadwinner) was impermissible sex discrimination in violation of equal 
protection and, importantly, that evidence of sex-based stereotypes alone 
could be evidence of sex discrimination, even without evidence of a 
“comparator” (a similarly situated man who was treated better).205 Elana 
 
 201. See supra Part IV.B.1. and C. 
 202. See Calvert, supra note 196, at 10–11; Williams & Bornstein, supra note 199, at 1322. 
 203. See Calvert, supra note 196, at 10–11; Williams & Bornstein, supra note 199, at 1328. 
 204. 365 F.3d 107, 113 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 205. Id. at 121–22. While Back was germinal in its holding that stereotyping of mothers could be 
gender stereotyping in violation of Title VII and equal protection without comparator evidence, prior 
to Back, many circuit courts had also held that stereotypical comments related to an employee’s 
pregnancy or motherhood could constitute evidence of sex discrimination. Id.; see, e.g., Lust v. Sealy, 
Inc., 383 F.3d 580, 583–84 (7th Cir. 2004) (involving an employer who assumed that the plaintiff would 
not want to relocate for her job because she had children); Laxton v. Gap Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 583 (5th 
Cir. 2003) (involving an employer who reacted angrily to the plaintiff’s pregnancy); Gorski v. N.H. 
Dept. of Corr., 290 F.3d 466, 473–74 (1st Cir. 2002) (involving an employer who commented 
derogatorily about the plaintiff’s pregnancy); Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 
F.3d 46, 55–56 (1st Cir. 2000) (involving an employer who implied that the plaintiff could not manage 
both a job and a family); Sheehan v. Donlen Corp., 173 F.3d 1039, 1043 (7th Cir. 1999) (involving an 
employer who told the plaintiff, upon termination, that now she would have time to take care of her 
children); Troy v. Bay State Computer Grp., Inc., 141 F.3d 378, 380–81 (1st Cir. 1998) (involving an 
employer who suggested that the plaintiff was unable to perform her job due to her pregnancy); 
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Back was a school psychologist who, for the first two years at her public 
elementary school, received consistently excellent evaluations from her 
two female supervisors, with ratings of “outstanding” or “superior” (the 
two highest marks) in most categories on her performance evaluations 
and repeated assurances that she would receive tenure.206 As her review 
for tenure with the school approached in her third year—and after she 
had taken a three-month maternity leave to give birth to a child—her 
evaluations changed.207 According to Back, one supervisor asked “how 
she was ‘planning on spacing [her] offspring,’” advised Back to “wait 
until [her son] was in kindergarten to have another child,” and suggested 
“maybe [Back] reconsider whether [she] could be a mother and do this 
job” because the supervisor “did not know how [Back] could possibly do 
this job with children.”208 Both supervisors told Back “that it was ‘not 
possible for [her] to be a good mother and have this job.’”209 They also 
questioned whether Back’s “apparent commitment to [her] job was an 
act,” and whether, once she was granted tenure, she “would not show the 
same level of commitment . . . because [she] had little ones at home.”210 
When Back was ultimately denied tenure and her probationary job status 
terminated, she filed suit for sex discrimination.211 
In its ruling in favor of Back, the Second Circuit held that 
“stereotyping about the qualities of mothers is a form of gender 
discrimination” that “can be determined in the absence of evidence 
about how the employer in question treated fathers.”212 To make her 
case, Back relied “upon a Price Waterhouse ‘stereotyping’ theory,” under 
which she argued that “comments made about a woman’s inability to 
combine work and motherhood are direct evidence of [sex] 
discrimination.”213 Writing for the Second Circuit, Judge Calabresi 
 
Barbano v. Madison Cnty., 922 F.2d 139, 143 (2d Cir. 1990) (involving an employer who questioned an 
applicant about her plans to get pregnant based on a desire not to hire a woman who would get 
pregnant and quit); Coble v. Hot Springs Sch. Dist. No. 6, 682 F.2d 721, 726 (8th Cir. 1982) (involving 
an employer who implied that the plaintiff was less available and dedicated to the job because she had 
a family). 
 206. Back, 365 F.3d at 114–15. 
 207. Id. at 115. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. (alteration in original). 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 113. Like in Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1314, 1316–17 (11th Cir. 2011), discussed 
in Part II.C, as a public employee, Back brought her claim as a constitutional violation of equal 
protection under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, rather than under Title VII, but this difference is irrelevant as the 
court applied Title VII precedent in the case. See Back, 365 F.3d at 119–21, 123–24 (applying Price 
Waterhouse to hold that Back had proved evidence of sex stereotyping that could amount to sex 
discrimination and applying the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting standard to find that Back met 
her burden to survive summary judgment). 
 212. Back, 365 F.3d at 113. 
 213. Id. at 119. 
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explained that being penalized at work based on an assumption that you 
will conform to a gender stereotype that is devalued is also evidence of 
sex discrimination: 
  It is the law . . . that “stereotyped remarks can certainly be evidence 
that gender played a part” in an adverse employment decision. The 
principle of Price Waterhouse . . . applies as much to the supposition 
that a woman will conform to a gender stereotype (and therefore will 
not, for example, be dedicated to her job), as to the supposition that a 
woman is unqualified for a position because she does not conform to a 
gender stereotype. 
 . . . Just as “[i]t takes no special training to discern sex stereotyping in a 
description of an aggressive female employee as requiring ‘a course at 
charm school’” so it takes no special training to discern stereotyping in 
the view that a woman cannot “be a good mother” and have a job that 
requires long hours, or in the statement that a mother who received 
tenure “would not show the same level of commitment [she] had 
shown because [she] had little ones at home.”214 
Thus, based on the precedent established in Price Waterhouse, judging a 
woman against a stereotype of feminine behavior and penalizing her at 
work based on that judgment is evidence of sex discrimination—whether 
you fault her for failing to conform or for assuming she will conform to the 
stereotype that women should be caregivers rather than breadwinners. 
To further clarify the legal standard for when gender stereotyping 
occurs, the court linked Elana Back’s experience not only to Price 
Waterhouse but also to stereotyping against men, both in the Oncale line 
of cases and the work-family context in Hibbs. Noting that to determine 
what constitutes a gender-based stereotype, courts must look to “the 
particular context in which it arises . . . without undue formalization,”215 
the court looked to Doe v. Belleville as an example, specifically the 
holding that harassing a man who “exhibits his masculinity in a way that 
does not meet his coworkers’ idea of how men are to appear and 
behave” constitutes harassment because of sex.216 The Supreme Court 
provided another example in Hibbs by noting that “mutually reinforcing 
stereotypes” of women as caregivers and men as breadwinners can “lead 
to subtle discrimination that may be difficult to detect on a case-by-case 
basis.”217 Summarizing its position, the court explained that “[t]he 
question . . . is whether a particular action . . . can be attributed to sex” 
and that “reliance upon stereotypical notions about how men and women 
 
 214. Id. at 119–20 (citations omitted) (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251, 256 
(1989)). 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. at 120 n.10 (quoting Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 581–82 (7th Cir. 1997)). 
 217. Id. at 121 (quoting Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 738 (2003)). 
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should appear and behave . . . reasonably suggests that the answer to that 
question is yes.”218 
Hibbs makes pellucidly clear . . . that, at least where stereotypes are 
considered, the notions that mothers are insufficiently devoted to 
work, and that work and motherhood are incompatible, are properly 
considered to be, themselves, gender-based. Hibbs explicitly called the 
stereotype that “women’s family duties trump those of the workplace” 
a “gender stereotype,” and cited a number of state [leave laws] . . . as 
evidence of “pervasive sex-role stereotype that caring for family 
members is women’s work.”219 
Like the direct evidence of sex stereotyping Ann Hopkins 
experienced in Price Waterhouse, the explicit statements that Back would 
not be committed or could not be a good employee because she was a 
mother were, themselves, direct evidence of sex discrimination. While 
comparator evidence might have strengthened her case, “the ultimate 
issue is the reasons for the individual plaintiff’s treatment, not the 
relative treatment of different groups within the workplace.”220 Nor does 
the employer’s evidence that the majority of teachers hired in the year 
Back was hired were women with children defeat Back’s claim, because 
“what matters is how Back was treated.”221 Because “stereotypical 
remarks about the incompatibility of motherhood and employment ‘can 
certainly be evidence that gender played a part’ in an employment 
decision,” the Second Circuit held, “stereotyping of women as caregivers 
can by itself and without more be evidence of an impermissible, sex-
based motive.”222 
2.  Back’s Progeny 
In almost a decade since the Back decision, an increasing number of 
federal courts as well as the EEOC, which enforces Title VII, have held 
that stereotyping of mothers may be unlawful sex discrimination under 
Title VII.223 In the jurisprudence of caregiver discrimination, it is 
commonly understood that harassing or penalizing a woman at work 
based on the assumption that she will be less committed or less 
competent because she is a mother—that she will conform to a negative 
caregiver stereotype—is unlawful sex discrimination. While a full 
 
 218. Id. at 120 n.10 (quoting Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 581–82 (7th Cir. 1997)). 
 219. Id. at 121 (citations omitted) (quoting Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 731–
33 nn.5–6 (2003)). 
 220. Id. at 121 (emphasis removed) (quoting Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 
2001)). 
 221. Id. at 122. 
 222. Id.  
 223. See Calvert, supra note 196, at 10–12; Williams & Bornstein, supra note 199, at 1342–43. 
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discussion of this case law is beyond the scope of this Article,224 two 
examples highlight how far the gender stereotyping theory has come in 
the protections it affords to mothers under Title VII. 
First, based on the evolving understanding of how stereotypes 
operate in the context of work and family and on the rapidly growing 
number of cases alleging caregiver discrimination, in 2007 the EEOC 
issued official enforcement guidance on the subject, entitled Enforcement 
Guidance: Unlawful Disparate Treatment of Workers with Caregiving 
Responsibilities.225 The EEOC adopted the holding in Back as its 
position, stating clearly that because “stereotypes that female caregivers 
should not, will not, or cannot be committed to their jobs are sex-based, 
employment decisions based on such stereotypes violate Title VII.”226 In 
an in-depth discussion citing case law and social scientific evidence, the 
EEOC explained the unlawful effects of employers “[r]elying on 
stereotypes of traditional gender roles and the division of domestic and 
workplace responsibilities” and how “gender stereotypes of caregivers 
may more broadly affect perceptions of a worker’s general 
competence.”227 While EEOC enforcement guidance is not formally 
binding on federal courts, as the agency’s official position, it has a 
persuasive impact both on judicial decisionmaking228 and on employer 
practice in the workplace.229 In 2009, responding to the continued growth 
of the field, the EEOC followed up with a document setting forth “best 
practices” for employers to avoid liability for caregiver discrimination.230 
Second, in the 2009 case Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., the First 
Circuit held that detrimental stereotyping of an individual mother could 
constitute sex discrimination even when the plaintiff was passed over for 
a promotion that went to another mother who had not been subject to 
 
 224. For a more complete discussion of the field of family responsibilities discrimination, see, for 
example, Williams & Bornstein, supra note 199; Calvert, supra note 196; Joan C. Williams & 
Stephanie Bornstein, Caregivers in the Courtroom: The Growing Trend of Family Responsibilities 
Discrimination, 41 U.S.F. L. Rev. 171 (2006); Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal 
Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 Harv. Women’s L.J. 
77 (2003). 
 225. EEOC, Enforcement Guidance: Unlawful Disparate Treatment of Workers with 
Caregiving Responsibilities (2007). 
 226. Id. at 11–12. 
 227. Id. at 10–21. 
 228. See, e.g., John S. Moot, Comment, An Analysis of Judicial Deference to EEOC Interpretative 
Guidelines, 1 Admin L.J. 213 (1987); Robyn S. Stoter, Note, Discrimination & Deference: Making a 
Case for the EEOC’s Expertise with English-Only Rules, 53 Vill. L. Rev. 595, 623–25 nn.164–69 
(2008). 
 229. See Mary C. Still, Family Responsibilities Discrimination and the New Institutionalism: The 
Interactive Process Through Which Legal and Social Factors Produce Institutional Change, 
59 Hastings L.J. 1491, 1513–14 (2008). 
 230. Employer Best Practices for Workers with Caregiving Responsibilities, EEOC, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiver-best-practices.html (last visited May 1, 2012). 
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similar stereotyping.231 Laurie Chadwick was a well-performing employee 
of WellPoint for nearly ten years, during which she had been 
promoted.232 She was also the mother of an eleven-year-old son and six-
year-old triplets (and was taking one college course per semester), but 
there was no indication that it affected her work performance; her 
husband, who worked nights and weekends, was the primary caregiver 
for the children during the day.233 When she was passed over for a second 
promotion in favor of someone with significantly less experience and 
lower performance evaluations, Chadwick sued for sex discrimination 
“based on the sex-based stereotype that mothers, particularly those with 
young children, neglect their work duties in favor of their presumed 
childcare obligations.”234 One supervisor who challenged an answer 
Chadwick gave in the interview for the promotion said, “Laurie, you are 
a mother[.] [W]ould you let your kids off the hook that easy if they made 
a mess in [their] room[?] [W]ould you clean it or hold them 
accountable?”235 The other, the ultimate decisionmaker, said upon 
learning that Chadwick had triplets, “Oh my—I did not know you had 
triplets. Bless you!”236 Then, when telling Chadwick she did not get the 
promotion, explained, “It was nothing you did or didn’t do. It was just 
that you’re going to school, you have the kids and you just have a lot on 
your plate right now.” Noting that if the three interviewers were in 
Chadwick’s position, “they would feel overwhelmed,” the supervisor told 
Chadwick she would be “happier with this [not working out] down the 
road.”237 
When the First Circuit sided with Chadwick, it indicated just how 
far the gender stereotyping theory has developed in the context of the 
stereotype of mothers as caregivers. While the evidence Chadwick 
presented certainly indicated unlawful stereotyping, it was not the type 
of overwhelming direct evidence with which courts were faced in Price 
Waterhouse or Back. Yet the court was still able to recognize it for what 
it was: acting on impermissibly gender-based assumptions. Moreover, 
Chadwick succeeded despite a factual scenario that might have been fatal 
to earlier claims: The person who was promoted instead of Chadwick was 
not only a woman but a mother of two children, aged nine and 
fourteen.238 WellPoint made much of this fact; the court, however, did 
 
 231. 561 F.3d 38, 42–49 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 232. Id. at 41. 
 233. Id. at 42. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. (alterations in original). 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. 
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not, noting that “[t]he principal focus of [Title VII] is the protection of 
the individual employee, rather than the protection of the minority group 
as a whole,”239 so “discrimination against one employee cannot be 
remedied solely by nondiscrimination against another employee in that 
same group.”240 It was not clear that the decisionmakers knew the woman 
they selected for promotion was a mother; regardless, the First Circuit 
held that “the stereotype that Chadwick complains of would arguably be 
more strongly held as to a mother of four children, three of whom were 
only six years old, than as to a mother of two older children.”241 Citing 
Price Waterhouse and Hibbs, the court explained clearly how those 
earlier precedents prohibit gender stereotyping of mothers today: 
  In the simplest terms, these cases stand for the proposition that 
unlawful sex discrimination occurs when an employer takes an adverse 
job action on the assumption that a woman, because she is a woman, 
will neglect her job responsibilities in favor of her presumed childcare 
responsibilities. . . . [A]n employer is not free to assume that a woman, 
because she is a woman, will necessarily be a poor worker because of 
family responsibilities. The essence of Title VII in this context is that 
women have the right to prove their mettle in the work arena without 
the burden of stereotypes regarding whether they can fulfill their 
responsibilities.242 
Thus, “[g]iven what we know about societal stereotypes regarding 
working women with children,” the court held that “a jury could 
reasonably determine that a sex-based stereotype was behind [the 
decisionmaker’s] explanation to Chadwick,”243 despite the fact that 
another woman with children got the promotion. 
B. Stereotyping Fathers as “Feminine” Men 
Beyond helping to develop a more sophisticated understanding of 
how gender stereotypes operate for working mothers, the field of 
caregiver discrimination also encompasses penalties against men who 
take on a more than nominal role in caring for their children or other 
family members. As discussed in Part III, the majority of caregiver 
discrimination claims brought by men are brought as violations of the 
FMLA. Yet the EEOC guidance on caregiver discrimination includes a 
discussion of Title VII protections for male caregivers who experience 
gender stereotyping. In addition, a recent and expanding field of social 
scientific studies documents that when men are penalized at work for 
 
 239. Id. at 42–43 n.4 (quoting Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 453–54 (1982)). 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. at 44–45. 
 243. Id. at 46–47. 
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taking on caregiving responsibilities, they are actually being penalized for 
violating gender norms of masculinity. 
1.  EEOC Guidance Extends Caregiver Stereotyping Theory to Men 
In its 2007 enforcement guidance on caregiver discrimination, the 
EEOC explicitly identified how Title VII offers protections for men who 
experience sex discrimination based on their caregiving responsibilities.244 
The guidance, which covers disparate treatment theories under Title VII 
and the Americans with Disabilities Act (the EEOC does not enforce the 
FMLA),245 includes a specific section entitled “Discrimination Against 
Male Caregivers.”246 Citing the Supreme Court in Hibbs, the EEOC 
notes: 
  The Supreme Court has observed that gender-based stereotypes also 
influence how male workers are perceived . . . . Stereotypes of men as 
“bread winners” can further lead to the perception that a man who 
works part time is not a good father [breadwinner], even if he does so 
to care for his children. Thus, while working women have generally 
borne the brunt of gender-based stereotyping, unlawful assumptions 
about working fathers and other male caregivers have sometimes led 
employers to deny male employees opportunities that have been 
provided to working women or to subject men who are primary 
caregivers to harassment or other disparate treatment.247 
The EEOC then provides specific examples of disparate treatment 
under Title VII, for example when women, but not men, are granted 
reduced or part-time schedules for child care reasons, or when women are 
treated more favorably in terms of family leave (unrelated to pregnancy-
disability leave) than men.248 The inclusion of language on stereotypes 
indicates that, where gender stereotyping of men in the work-family 
context itself amounts to harassment or is the basis of an adverse action, 
it may be actionable as sex discrimination under Title VII. 
2.  Social Scientific Studies Document Male Caregivers Being 
Penalized for Gender Nonconformity 
Underscoring current case law and the EEOC guidance, social 
scientific studies over the past two decades have documented that when 
men are penalized at work for taking an active role in family caregiving, 
they are being penalized for failing to conform to the gender stereotype 
that men should be breadwinners and not caregivers. Early studies 
 
 244. See EEOC, supra note 225, at 24–25. 
 245. Id. at 1. 
 246. Id. at 24–25. 
 247. Id. at 24 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 
538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003)). 
 248. Id. at 25. 
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documented that men who worked part-time or took advantage of family 
and medical leaves experienced steep penalties at work that were related 
to gender stereotypes.249 Men who worked part-time were seen as unable 
to fulfill their traditional obligation of full-time employment and thus 
lower in “agency” (an attribute associated with masculinity) than were 
other men as a consequence of their loss of this positive role.250 Fathers 
who took a parental leave of absence, even a short one, were viewed as 
less committed and were recommended for fewer rewards than were 
women who did so, and received lower ratings on work performance 
than similarly situated women.251 
Recent studies in an emerging field of inquiry known as the 
“flexibility stigma” (which links the penalties experienced by workers 
who adopt flexible or reduced work schedules to maternal wall bias) not 
only confirm these findings, but also show that penalties can be triggered 
for caregiving men even when they do not take an actual leave from 
work.252 In one study, men who requested a twelve-week family leave to 
care for a sick child or parent experienced what the researchers 
described as a “femininity stigma, whereby ‘acting like a woman’ 
deprives them of masculine agency (e.g., competence and assertiveness) 
and impugns them with negative feminine qualities (e.g., weakness and 
uncertainty).”253 As a result, they were “more likely to be viewed as poor 
workers and subject to penalties,” (demotion, reduced pay or 
responsibilities, termination, or layoff) and “less likely to be 
recommended for rewards” (promotion, raises, training, or choice 
projects).254 In another study, workers who requested a reduced schedule 
 
 249. See, e.g., Tammy D. Allen & Joyce E.A. Russell, Parental Leave of Absence: Some Not So 
Family-Friendly Implications, 29 J. Applied Soc. Psychol. 166 (1999); Adam B. Butler & Amie 
Skattebo, What Is Acceptable for Women May Not Be for Men: The Effect of Family Conflicts with 
Work on Job Performance Ratings, 77 J. Occup. & Org. Psychol. 553 (2004); Alice H. Eagly & Valerie 
J. Steffen, Gender Stereotypes, Occupational Roles, and Beliefs About Part-Time Employees, 
10 Psychol. Women Q. 252 (1986); Julie Holliday Wayne & Bryanne L. Cordeiro, Who Is a Good 
Organizational Citizen?: Social Perception of Male and Female Employees Who Use Family Leave, 
49 Sex Roles 233, 233–34 (2003); see also Martin H. Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave Revisited, 19 N. 
Ill. U. L. Rev. 25, 39 (1998). 
 250. See Eagly & Steffen, supra note 249, at 254. 
 251. See Allen & Russell, supra note 249, at 166; Butler & Skattebo, supra note 249, at 553–59; 
Wayne & Cordeiro, supra note 249, at 233–34. 
 252. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Berdahl & Sun H. Moon, Workplace Mistreatment of Middle Class 
Workers Based on Sex, Parenthood, and Caregiving (Working Paper, 2012) (on file with Author); 
Laurie A. Rudman & Kris Mescher, Penalizing Men Who Request a Family Leave: Is Flexibility Stigma 
a Femininity Stigma? (Working Paper, 2012) (on file with Author); Joseph A. Vandello, et al., When 
Equal Isn’t Really Equal: The Masculine Dilemma of Seeking Work Flexibility (Working Paper, 2012) 
(on file with Author). The Journal of Social Issues has accepted a formal proposal to publish these and 
related articles in a forthcoming special issue on the flexibility stigma. 
 253. Rudman & Mescher, supra note 252, at 3, 6–7. 
 254. Id. at 12–14. 
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after the birth of a new child “were seen as less masculine and more 
feminine than people who worked traditional hours” and were rated 
lower on positive job characteristics than full-time workers; but a man 
who did so “in effect suffered more by it, because the woman is seen as 
conforming to feminine prescriptions whereas a man is seen as a gender 
deviant.”255 In a third study, researchers documented that when 
compared to all men and traditional fathers, “fathers who engaged in a 
high amount of childcare experienced significantly more masculinity 
harassment” (derided for not being “tough enough” or for being “soft-
spoken or shy,” or pressured to “sacrifice family or personal time” to 
gain respect at work) and more general workplace mistreatment 
(excluded, ignored, insulted, bullied, or humiliated).256 Thus, a growing 
body of social science evidence indicates that, for men, demonstrating a 
high level of participation in family care triggers penalties for gender 
nonconformity: A man who does so is behaving like a mother and is 
therefore inconsistent with gender stereotypes of men as breadwinners, 
not caregivers. 
C.  Achieving Ginsburg’s Vision: Workplace Penalties for 
Caregiving Men as Title VII Gender Stereotyping for Failing to 
Conform to a Masculine Norm 
Putting these four jurisprudential pieces together—sex 
discrimination as the operation of gender stereotypes under equal 
protection (as in Wiesenfeld), Title VII (as in Price Waterhouse), the 
FMLA (as in Hibbs), and caregiver discrimination (as in Back)—does 
not create a new legal claim. Indeed, since Price Waterhouse, Doe v. 
Belleville, and Oncale, men have been able to allege sex discrimination 
under a gender stereotyping theory for failing to conform to masculine 
norms, and since long before Ginsburg litigated Wiesenfeld, acting like a 
caregiver rather than an unencumbered breadwinner has been a 
violation of masculine norms. Yet it is useful to draw the path through 
these lines of precedent to illustrate what plaintiffs and courts are still 
missing. Despite data and human experience that tell us that many men 
perceive active family caregiving to be “career suicide,” men are not 
alleging this legal theory as robustly as they could and, relatedly, courts 
are not recognizing it as much as they should. A few cases in which male 
plaintiffs have attempted to allege sex discrimination under a gender 
stereotyping theory in the work-family context prove illustrative. 
The most successful attempt at this theory in recent years was made 
in Knussman v. Maryland, an early caregiver discrimination case brought 
 
 255. Vandello, et al., supra note 252, at 18–19. 
 256. Berdahl & Moon, supra note 252, at 16–17, 23–24. 
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as sex discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause because the 
plaintiff was a public employee seeking access to a benefit.257 Maryland 
state trooper Kevin Knussman’s wife Kimberly became pregnant and 
developed complications that required bed rest.258 When Knussman 
requested four to eight weeks of “paid ‘family sick leave’ to care for his 
wife and spend time with his family following the birth of his child,” his 
supervisor told him “that there was ‘no way’ that he would be allowed 
more than two weeks,” (his department was understaffed) and, 
incorrectly, that any more leave than that would have to be unpaid under 
the FMLA.259 Shortly before the birth of his daughter, his employer 
announced a new “nurturing leave” law applying to state employees that 
allowed primary caregivers—those “primarily responsible for the care 
and nurturing of a child”—to use up to thirty days of accrued sick leave to 
care for a newborn child and secondary caregivers—those “secondarily 
responsible for the care and nurturing of a child”—to use up to ten days.260 
When Knussman inquired about his ability to take leave under the new 
law, the female personnel manager told him that “only birth mothers 
could qualify as primary care givers; fathers would only be permitted to 
take leave as secondary care givers since they ‘couldn’t breast feed a 
baby.’”261 After his daughter was born, his wife experienced continued 
health problems, so Knussman again tried to extend his leave, this time 
explaining that, given his wife’s health problems, “he was the primary 
care giver for the child” because “he was performing the majority of the 
essential functions such as diaper changing, feeding, bathing and taking 
the child to the doctor.”262 The personnel manager again denied his 
continued requests, explaining that “God made women to have babies 
and, unless [he] could have a baby,” there was no way he could qualify.263 
“[H]is wife had to be ‘in a coma or dead’ . . . for Knussman to qualify as 
the primary care giver.”264 
Citing, among other cases, Reed, Frontiero, Califano, and 
Wiesenfeld, the Fourth Circuit agreed that Knussman’s state employer 
violated equal protection when it applied the nurturing leave policy 
“unequally solely on the basis of a gender stereotype.”265 The court 
compared the case to those striking down classifications based on 
 
 257. 272 F.3d 625 (4th Cir. 2001). The initial case also included violations of the FMLA, but those 
were vacated at the district court level. Id. at 632. 
 258. Id. at 628. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. (quoting Md. Code Ann. State Pers. & Pens. § 7-508(a)(1)–(b)(1) (1994)). 
 261. Id. at 629. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. (alterations in original). 
 264. Id. at 630. 
 265. Id. at 634–36.  
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“conventional notions about the proper station in society for males and 
females” and “generalizations about typical gender roles in the raising 
and nurturing of children.”266 The stereotyping in this case was extreme, 
and Knussman was able to bring his claim directly following the equal 
protection precedent established by Ginsburg’s early cases. Yet as a 
recent reminder of how entrenched gender stereotypes impact men and 
women at work differently, Knussman stands for the proposition that 
stereotyping men out of caregiving roles constitutes sex discrimination. 
Indeed, Knussman was cited by the Eleventh Circuit in the recent Title 
VII case of Glenn v. Brumby when noting that “discrimination on the 
basis of gender stereotype” may include a man “taking too active a role 
in child-rearing.”267 
Beyond Knussman, other men who have alleged sex discrimination 
under a gender stereotyping theory based on family caregiving have had 
less success, often due to a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law 
or to some lack of proof or fact. For example, in Hayden v. Garden Ridge 
Management, LLC, the district court held against the plaintiff on his Title 
VII sex discrimination claim based on an incorrect application of the law 
regarding what a plaintiff is required to show to make out a prima facie 
case of sex discrimination under Title VII.268 Tom Hayden was working 
as a store general manager when he requested FMLA leave to care for 
his wife and newborn child for three intermittent periods totaling the 
twelve weeks to which he was entitled by law.269 In response to his 
request, the company’s human resources representative, a woman, 
“questioned the amount of time he requested off and stated ‘[i]t’s very 
strange that we have a male manager request that amount of time off, we 
have never had that before.’”270 His request was granted—but then he 
was fired a week later.271 When he sued alleging violations of the FMLA 
and for sex discrimination under Title VII, his claim for FMLA 
retaliation was upheld against his employer’s motion for summary 
judgment; his Title VII claim, however, was not.272 In a cursory 
discussion, the magistrate judge who wrote the opinion required that, “to 
establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination,” Hayden had to 
show that “he was replaced by a person not in the protected group.”273 
The court reasoned that because the plaintiff was “replaced by another 
 
 266. Id. at 636. 
 267. 663 F.3d 1312, 1318–19 n.8 (1ith Cir. 2011).  
 268. No. 4:08cv172, 2009 WL 5196718, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 22, 2009). 
 269. Id. at *1. 
 270. Id. at *4 (alteration in original). 
 271. Id. at *1. 
 272. Id. at *5.  
 273. Id. (citing St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993); Alvarado v. Tex. Rangers, 
492 F.3d 605, 611 (5th Cir. 2007)). 
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male . . . he cannot show he was replaced by someone outside his 
protected class, and his gender discrimination claim therefore fails.”274 
Yet this is a basic misreading of federal employment discrimination law 
that has been rejected by the Supreme Court in the context of age 
discrimination, and by most circuit courts in the context of sex and race 
discrimination: A plaintiff’s claim of discrimination is not barred simply 
because he was replaced by a member of the same protected class.275 
Unfortunately, due to the court’s misapplication of Title VII sex 
discrimination to a male plaintiff, Hayden was denied the chance to 
prove his sex discrimination claim under a gender stereotyping theory.276 
Other cases show how men alleging sex discrimination for 
caregiving issues may be particularly disadvantaged by courts that 
misapply the comparator “requirement” under Title VII due to the 
widespread mistreatment of working women based on their caregiving 
responsibilities. To make out a prima facie case of sex discrimination 
under Title VII, a plaintiff must allege, among other things, that the 
adverse employment action he experienced arose “under circumstances 
which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.”277 As 
described previously,278 the most common (and traditionally most 
convincing279) way for a plaintiff to prove this is by pointing to a 
comparator—a similarly qualified coworker from outside the protected 
class who was treated better. Yet this is not required by Title VII.280 
Despite this fact, some courts still require a plaintiff to provide such 
comparator evidence to make out a prima facie case under Title VII,281 
which may pose particular hurdles for caregiving men. 
 
 274. Id. 
 275. See Dianne Avery et al., Employment Discrimination Law: Cases and Materials on 
Equality in the Workplace 110–11 (8th ed. 2010) (citing O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers 
Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312 (1996), and its progeny) (“[T]he fact that one person in the protected class has 
lost out to another person in the protected class is . . . irrelevant, so long as he has lost because of [a 
protected classification].”). 
 276. The case, however, settled. See Verdict, Agreement and Settlement, Hayden v. Garden Ridge 
Mgmt., LLC, No. 4:08CV172, 2010 WL 1483289 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2010). 
 277. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). 
 278. For a discussion of this issue in the context of the Back decision, see supra notes 205–22 and 
accompanying text. 
 279. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (describing, in a race discrimination 
case, that evidence of white employees with “comparable” backgrounds who were treated better than 
the black plaintiff would be “especially relevant” to a showing that the employer was motivated by 
unlawful discrimination). 
 280. See Avery et al., supra note 275, at 111–13; see also Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by 
Comparison, 120 Yale L.J. 728, 731–32 n.3 (2011); Ernest F. Lidge III, The Courts’ Misuse of the 
Similarly Situated Concept in Employment Discrimination Law, 67 Mo. L. Rev. 831, 839 (2002); 
Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Discrimination by Comparators, 60 Ala. L. 
Rev. 191, 204–06 (2009). 
 281. See Avery et al., supra note 275, at 111–13 (discussing how some circuit courts of appeals 
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For example, in McGarity v. Mary Kay Cosmetics, the district court 
granted summary judgment against plaintiff Gregory McGarity’s Title 
VII sex discrimination claim (and his FMLA claims) when he failed to 
prove that a similarly situated woman was treated better than he.282 When 
McGarity, a cosmetics technician, told his supervisor he planned to take 
FMLA leave when his wife gave birth to their third child, his supervisor 
“reacted badly” and “complained to others in their department that men 
could not or should not be allowed to take leave for the birth of a 
child.”283 Nevertheless, McGarity was granted three weeks of leave, after 
which he claimed that his supervisor reacted with hostility, subjecting 
McGarity to unwarranted “accusations” of “errors,” “inaccurate 
complaints” about his work efforts, and “miscalculations of McGarity’s 
efficiency ratings” based on which his performance was judged.284 As a 
result, McGarity was suspended; he complained to human resources but, 
believing his complaint was not taken seriously, ultimately left to take 
another job.285 Based on the employer’s evidence that “women in the 
company [who] had taken FMLA leave . . . had not been treated any 
differently on return” and that men “who had not taken FMLA leave 
[but made workplace mistakes] received the same disciplinary sanctions 
as McGarity in similar situations,” the district court held that McGarity 
had not made out a prima facie case of sex discrimination.286 Indeed, this 
particular case may have lacked a strong enough factual basis to prove 
sex discrimination based on a gender stereotyping theory.287 Regardless, 
the district court undermined a potentially legitimate sex discrimination 
claim through a mistaken framing of the requirements for making out a 
prima facie case. McGarity lost at summary judgment because the court 
compared his treatment to that of women who signaled their role as 
caregivers by taking a family leave, and to gender conforming men with 
poor workplace performance. Neither comparison rebuts the claim that, 
consistent with a gender stereotyping theory under Title VII, a man who 
participates in family caregiving and, therefore, fails to conform to the 
masculine breadwinner stereotype may be penalized at work for doing so 
when he is subsequently subjected to greater scrutiny and discipline.288 
 
require comparator evidence, while others view it as only one means for proving an inference of 
discrimination). 
 282. No. 3:96-cv-3413-R, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1150, at *13–14 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 20, 1998). 
 283. Id. at *2. 
 284. Id. at *3. 
 285. Id. at *3–4. 
 286. Id. at *13–14. 
 287. Id. at *15–16 (discussing how McGarity’s case, even had it made it passed the prima facie 
stage, might have failed at the pretext stage based on his admission that he did, in fact, make the 
mistake that led to his suspension). 
 288. For other examples of courts misapplying the comparator requirement to Title VII claims 
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Still other cases show courts dismissing evidence of gender 
stereotyping of men in the work-family context as either insignificant or 
as based not on sex but on status as a parent (which is not protected 
under federal law), thus missing the point that penalizing men for failure 
to conform to a masculine gender stereotype can rise to the level of sex 
discrimination. In Cumbie v. General Shale Brick, the district court 
granted summary judgment against a plaintiff after finding that the 
family-care-related sexual harassment and retaliation he experienced did 
not amount to sex discrimination.289 Dana Cumbie, a fifty-five-year-old 
male truck driver for a brick company who lived with and cared for his 
eighty-seven-year-old mother, was met with a number of harassing 
drawings of him posted and spread around his workplace several times 
over the course of a month.290 One drawing depicted him riding a 
motorcycle with his mother; another pictured him in a boat with two men 
and a drum of Preparation H floating nearby, with the caption “butt 
hurts”; a third showed him on a couch next to a penis pump and, at the 
announcement of the band the Dixie Chicks on television, saying, 
“What? Chicks with Dix?”291 Cumbie complained to his employer, who 
agreed it was offensive; yet over the next two months, despite having 
received excellent performance ratings and three merit awards in the 
prior year, Cumbie was given less work, required to take an alcohol test, 
and suspended twice for failing to report workers’ compensation claims 
“in a timely manner.”292  
Then, while on an FMLA leave to care for his mother, Cumbie was 
terminated before his leave expired.293 While finding that the drawings 
derided Cumbie for being a “Momma’s Boy” and “inappropriately 
ridicule[d] [him] as gay, . . . impotent and somehow interested in 
transsexuals,” the district court found that the harassment was merely 
“boorish and juvenile” and “insufficient to . . . lead[] a person to 
reasonably believe” that he had experienced hostile work environment 
sexual harassment that amounted to sex discrimination.294 Further, 
because the underlying sex discrimination claim was unreasonable, the 
 
brought by men in the context of family caregiving, see, for example, Palomares v. Second Federal 
Savings & Loan Ass’n of Chicago, No. 10-cv-6124, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19143 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 25, 
2011); Samuels v. Baltimore, No. RDB 09-458, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96228 (D. Md. Oct. 15, 2009); 
Beyst v. Pinnacle Airlines, Inc., No. 07-10927, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45468 (E.D. Mich. June 11, 2008) 
(making a similar claim under state law). 
 289. 508 F. Supp. 2d 486 (E.D. Va. 2007), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 302 F. App’x 
192 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 290. Id. at 488. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. at 488–89. 
 293. Id. at 489. 
 294. Id. at 491. 
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district court held that the retaliation that occurred after Cumbie 
complained was not actionable.295 The appellate court remanded the 
retaliation claim.296 
Similarly, in Marchioli v. Garland Co., the district court ruled that 
an employer’s threat to heavily scrutinize an employee who was about to 
become a father, although “clearly reprehensible,” was not enough to 
amount to sex discrimination and dismissed plaintiff’s Title VII claim.297 
Plaintiff Anthony Marchioli was performing his job as a sales 
representative well, receiving “very positive evaluations,” when his 
girlfriend became pregnant.298 He requested one afternoon off to assist 
her with finding a doctor.299 Immediately, his supervisor began criticizing 
his work and gave him a negative evaluation, despite the fact that 
Marchioli had reached one hundred percent of his sales quota after three 
months of work.300 In a written evaluation, his supervisor warned him 
about “distractions,” given his girlfriend’s pregnancy, and expressed his 
clear view that active participation in family caregiving was inconsistent 
with being a good salesman: 
You need to decide if you want to totally commit yourself to this 
endeavor. If you don’t want to “buy in” and put a maximum effort into 
developing your career, do me . . . a favor and quit now. . . . I’m not 
going to tolerate working with a guy who does not give it his 
all. . . . You need to decide what you want to do. I intend to monitor 
very closely your progress from here on out. If you do not want to 
work under that kind of scrutiny, leave now.301 
The next month, Marchioli was fired.302  
The district court, while granting the employer’s motion to dismiss 
Marchioli’s complaint for sex discrimination under Title VII, held that 
Marchioli “was terminated because of his gender-neutral classification as 
a parent or parent-to-be.”303 Yet in doing so, the district court overlooked 
that terminating a male employee after he signaled gender 
nonconformity (that he planned to take an active role in caregiving by 
requesting an afternoon off to find a doctor), overtly stating that it was 
not possible to be both a good worker and an active caregiver, and 
 
 295. Id. at 491–92. 
 296. Cumbie v. Gen. Shale Brick, 302 F. App’x 192, 194 (2008).  
 297. No. 5:11-CV-124, 2011 WL 1983350, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. May 20, 2011). 
 298. Id. at *1. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id. at *1–2. 
 301. Id. at *1. 
 302. Id. at *2. 
 303. Id. at *5. The court also dismissed Marchioli’s claims for pregnancy discrimination under the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act (because only pregnant women are covered by the Act) and for 
associational discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (because his girlfriend’s normal 
pregnancy did not meet the definition of “disabled” under the Act). Id. at *5, *8. 
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threatening to hyperscrutinize “a guy who does not give it his all” could 
amount to actionable gender stereotyping of a male employee. Indeed, 
while it is not clear that Marchioli ultimately could have proven gender 
discrimination under Title VII, the district court did not give him a 
chance, dismissing his case before it even began.304 
As these cases and others like them demonstrate, many courts—and 
even plaintiffs’ attorneys—have yet to understand how Title VII gender 
stereotyping theory applies to prevent sex discrimination against 
caregiving men. Rooting out employment decisions based on 
stereotypical notions of the roles men and women should properly play 
at work and at home is at the very core of how the Supreme Court has 
always defined sex discrimination. While the courts have yet to decide a 
Price Waterhouse-style discrimination case on behalf of a man penalized 
at work for failing to conform to the masculine stereotype of the 
unencumbered breadwinner, such a decision may only be a matter of 
time. One case pending in federal district court in Massachusetts, Ayanna 
v. Dechert, LLP, provides an example of how to effectively plead such a 
claim.305 In the lawsuit, plaintiff Ariel Ayanna, a male attorney and father 
of two, alleged sex discrimination under Title VII and the state law 
equivalent based on a gender stereotyping theory.306 Ayanna was a well-
performing attorney who had received a bonus; then his wife became 
pregnant with their second child and experienced serious mental health 
problems.307 Ayanna took leave to care for his children and wife; when he 
returned, the firm discriminated and retaliated against him, limiting his 
assignments and opportunities and ultimately terminating him.308 As the 
complaint alleges: 
Ayanna was an equal co-parent of his children . . . . After [his wife 
suffered serious health issues], he became the primary caretaker of 
their children and had to care for her, assuming a traditionally 
“female” role. 
   . . . Dechert’s firm culture equates masculinity with relegating 
caretaking to women and working long hours in the office. . . . Ayanna 
did not conform to Dechert’s firm culture for males. 
   . . . Ayanna contends that Dechert terminated him because [among 
other things] he refused to assume a stereotypically “male” role in 
connection with his children . . . .309 
 
 304. Id. at *8. As of May 20, 2011, the complaint has been dismissed and the case closed. 
 305. Complaint and Jury Demand, Ayanna v. Dechert, LLP, No. 110CV12155, 2010 WL 5344371 
(D. Mass. Dec. 14, 2010). 
 306. Id.  
 307. Id.  
 308. Id. 
 309. Id. 
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The complaint also states that, because he was a man, “Ayanna was 
treated differently from female caregivers,” who generally “were allowed 
and expected to leave or rearrange their schedules to attend to [family] 
obligations, to work from home, and to return to work later in the 
evening.”310 This, the complaint alleges, “demonstrat[es] that [his 
employer] intends that only women were to fulfill this role and 
discriminates against men who take a traditionally ‘female’ caretaking 
role.”311 As such, in addition to claims under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act and the FMLA, the complaint includes counts for “sex 
discrimination based upon disparate treatment and unlawful 
stereotyping” in violation of Title VII and the equivalent state law.312 
While the case may be the first to plead the issue so clearly, the 
precedent established from the early equal protection cases through 
Price Waterhouse, and from Oncale through Hibbs, supports the idea that 
penalizing men at work for failing to conform to masculine stereotypes of 
breadwinners, free from the demands of—or desire for—family 
caregiving, may be actionable sex discrimination. 
Conclusion 
Forty years ago, Ruth Bader Ginsburg understood that the ideology 
of separate spheres was as limiting to men as it was to women and, 
through her litigation strategy, led the Supreme Court to define sex 
discrimination in a way that encompassed this understanding. In the 
intervening decades, the law has evolved to recognize that stereotyping 
women out of the market sphere and into the domestic sphere is 
actionable sex discrimination. Precedent has also established that 
penalizing both women and men at work for failing to conform to 
“impermissibly cabined view[s] of the proper behavior”313 for each is 
actionable sex discrimination under a gender stereotyping theory. Yet 
gender-based stereotypes around expected roles in the work and family 
context remain strongly entrenched in American society. While male 
caregivers often prevail in lawsuits alleging that they were penalized at 
work for using family leave or benefits to which they were entitled (for 
example, under the FMLA or an employer policy), they have yet to use 
Title VII gender stereotyping theory in a robust fashion to remedy this 
problem. 
 
 310. Id. ¶ 28. 
 311. Id. 
 312. Id. The plaintiff later voluntarily dismissed his federal Title VII and Americans with 
Disabilities Act claims but maintained his state law claims. Ayanna v. Dechert LLP, No. 10-12155-
NMG, 2012 WL 39580, at *1 (D. Mass. Jan. 6, 2012). 
 313. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 236–37 (1989). 
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By the letter of the law, this Article argues, men currently have a 
cause of action for such gender stereotyping under Title VII. Yet federal 
courts’ understanding of how to apply Title VII in lawsuits by men 
alleging stereotyping based on their participation in family care—and 
some plaintiffs attorneys’ understanding of how to effectively plead such 
a case—has limited the effectiveness of this remedy. Courts are poised to 
take the final step in ridding the workplace of separate spheres ideology: 
recognizing that stereotyping men out of the domestic sphere and into 
the market sphere is actionable sex discrimination based on unlawful 
gender stereotypes. This step is needed for antidiscrimination law to 
achieve its full promise of allowing individuals access to gender equality, 
free from the sex-based stereotypes that constrain them, whether they 
are men or women—a promise Ginsburg envisioned four decades ago. 
 
